

Local Level Participatory Budgeting: Case of Banyuwangi Regency, Indonesia

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the implementation process of public budgeting through a recess forum in Banyuwangi Regency. One of the most radical changes in the development planning process in Indonesia is the emergence of a *bottom-up* planning model, which was marked by the issuance of Law No.22/2009 on Regional Autonomy. One of the *best practices* that is considered very successful in bottom-up planning forums is *participatory budgeting* in Brazil, which was later adopted by many countries around the world. In Indonesia, Development Planning Deliberation is one of the forums considered to represent *participatory budgeting*, but a number of shortcomings in the implementation of Development Planning Deliberation have caused the community to look for other forums to convey various development proposals in the region. One forum that is considered more effective is through recess forums conducted by legislative institutions. This research was conducted to examine in depth the process and dynamics of *participatory budgeting* and the *participatory budgeting* model in the recess forum in Banyuwangi Regency. The method used in this research is qualitative with a *Naturalist methodology* approach. Based on the research conducted, the public budgeting process through the recess forum cannot be implemented as dimensions in participatory budgeting. This is because the public budgeting process through the recess forum will always be tied to the political dynamics being faced by Local house of representatives member. Meanwhile, the political dynamics that occur are determined by political interactions between political actors, especially to gain political support in general elections.

Keywords:

public budget; recess forum; political dynamics

Introduction

One of the radical changes in the development planning process after the reformation in 1998 and through the tools of Law No. 22 of 2009 concerning Regional Autonomy is the accommodation of the Indonesian National development planning system from the *bottom up*, as well as a *top down* approach, conceptually it will ensure a balance between the national scale development model (*top down*) and development on a local scale (*bottom up*) in regional

development planning, but it is often found in various regions that development interests which are local aspirations must be eliminated in coordination meetings at higher levels of development planning (Kuncoro, 2018). As a result, various proposals submitted at higher levels of government, such as the Province and the Centre, are only dominated by proposals from the Regency government, while proposals from the community have no clear realization. Even at the government level, proposals submitted through Development Planning Deliberation are often not clearly realized, indicating that community participation is still very low.

One of the development planning mechanisms that is then considered as a representation of a local scale development planning model is Development Planning Deliberation. In terms of procedures and implementation time, development Planning Deliberation can be carried out based on a *timeline* that is planned in stages, but Development Planning Deliberation as a *bottom-up* development planning model then turns into development planning as a formal requirement for community participation mechanisms in development planning. The emergence of the assumption that the Development Planning Deliberation forum is ineffective and futile and superficial (Chalid, 2005). The same thing was also conveyed by (Salahudin, 2012) The involvement of public participation in public policy in Development Planning Deliberation only follows the times and is not part of the political will of stakeholders. So Development Planning Deliberation, apart from being a medium for public budgeting, can actually be used to improve and deepen the quality of democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001). To deepen the quality of democracy, of course, Development Planning Deliberation cannot only rely on procedures that have been carried out in stages but must also substantially deepen the quality of democracy by improving the level of community welfare (Barro, 1994).

Experience in various countries, *participatory budgeting* implementation studies of *Participatory budgeting* in several countries in the world there are substantial differences when compared to the implementation of *Participatory budgeting* in Porto Alegre Brazil, the results of the study of Cabanes (2015) who conducted a broader study, about 20 cities in five continents showed that *Participatory Budgeting* contributed significantly to improving the provision and management of basic services in these 20 cities. Discussing *Participatory Budgeting* cannot be seen only in a single face in the implementation of democracy, in Seville Spain *Participatory Budgeting* was designed as an instrument to deepen democracy. While in Mozambique *Participatory Budgeting* was designed as a trigger for *Good Governance*. In Solingen Germany *Participatory Budgeting* was used as a tool of *technocratic logic* in the formulation of public policy (Cabanes and Lipietz, 2015). The different results of *Participatory Budgeting* are still very relevant to study, especially in Indonesia.

In addition to the Development Planning Deliberation mechanism, there is also an alternative *public* budgeting proposal that can be used through the recess forum Local House of Representatives members. As an alternative mechanism, the recess forum can also be used if there is a potential failure to propose local and community interests that fail to be budgeted through Development Planning Deliberation. In terms of the process of proposing a public budget through the recess forum, it is considered much simpler and safer because the proposal is only through legislative members and legislative members can actively escort through political channels so that the proposals are made. Unlike the Development Planning Deliberation, which is made to look more technocratic, the recess forum is more political. So the process that occurs in public budgeting through political channels, the pattern of interaction is bound by the political dynamics that are happening, especially before the general election (Wildavsky, 1984).

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the process of Public *Participation* in the recess forum of Banyuwangi Regency Local House of Representatives members in the formulation of the Regional Budget (budget for regional revenue and expenditure) has relied On The Dimensions In The *Participatory Budgeting* Model. This Research Will Provide an in-depth analysis of the *knowledge gap* between *Participatory Budgeting* and budgeting through recess forums, because efforts to improve the quality of public budgeting forums such as recess forums in Indonesia so that they can be carried out more participatory have begun, such as the idea of a participatory recess forum initiated by the Bhakti Foundation (Palulungan et al., 2018). Positioning the recess forum as the same as *participatory budgeting*, of course, does not simply compare the two diametrically, or if you want to improve the quality of the recess forum by directly adapting the dimensions of *participatory budgeting* to the recess forum, such a step will certainly face very complex institutional problems, Because *participatory budgeting* operates only in dealing with tiered bureaucratic technocratic, but in addition to having to interact with many technocratic stakeholders, such as political parties, bureaucracy and politicians with various interests, and at the same time there are political dynamics that bring together many interests in a much more complicated political field. So to be able to understand the process in the recess forum, it is also necessary to understand the political dynamics that surround it.

On a global scale, there is a public budgeting mechanism that emerged from the political practices of a developing country, Brazil, known as *Participatory Budgeting* (Cabanés and Lipietz, 2015). Conceptually, the practice of *Participatory Budgeting* is a *bottom-up* development planning model that is similar to the Development Planning Deliberation (National Development Planning Conference) in Indonesia. According to Affandi et al. (2023) Development Planning Deliberation is considered a representation of *Participatory Budgeting* in Indonesia, but in

practice Development Planning Deliberation is a mechanism that although by design is a *bottom-up* mechanism, in reality the participation mechanism in Development Planning Deliberation is dominated by elite groups and is not participatory (Purwaningsih, 2022).

Studies on recess forums have been dominated to see the level of effectiveness of recess forums conducted by Local House of Representatives members in various regions, several studies on existing recesses include (Kariem and Ishmatuddin, 2020) who conducted a study in Banyuasin Regency and obtained research findings that recess activities carried out by Local House of Representatives members in Banyuasin Regency were very effective. Different results from a study conducted by (Pujiati, 2017) which compares the level of effectiveness of Development Planning Deliberation and recess carried out in the preparation of the Pesawaran Regency Budget for Regional Revenue and Expenditure with the findings that in 2018 the activities proposed through Development Planning Deliberation can be absorbed as much as 62.3% while recess is only around 37.7%. Another study (Badrika and Sulandari, 2022) (Badrika and Sulandari, 2022), which conducted a study on the effectiveness of the implementation of recess for members of the Tabanan Regency Local House Of Representatives in Bali, showed that in terms of absorption of community aspirations, it proved to be very effective. Meanwhile, Wenas et.al (2021) who conducted a study on the implementation of recess in Tomohon City still considered that the implementation of recess for Local House Of Representatives members in Tohon City was not effective, because the results of the recess had not prioritized groups in need. The recess was very exclusive and only concerned with the constituents of legislative members in Tomohon City.

Currently, an in-depth study of how the recess forum if associated with *participatory budgeting* has never been done in Indonesia or even in the world, because an in-depth study of the recess forum with the dimensions that exist in *participatory budgeting* will provide a deep and substantial study of the recess forum, because there are dimensions that will not only discuss pragmatic procedures in democracy (Cabannes, 2015), but will also discuss the more substantial dimensions of democracy (Cabanes and Lipietz, 2015; Cabannes, 2015).

The recess forum is a forum conducted by legislative members to absorb the aspirations of the community and is carried out outside the session period, the recess forum is used by legislative members to meet with their constituents and monitor development realization, see various problems faced by the community, and receive or capture aspirations in the electoral district. (Palulungan et al., 2018).. During this time, the recess forum is also used to propose projects and activities in the community, so then in its implementation the recess forum also involves and invites citizens in the electoral district of legislative members, to discuss the

findings during the recess forum both during the process and the dynamics that are being faced, then the researcher will analyze it based on the dimensions in *participatory budgeting*, as a comparative discussion between *participatory budgeting* and the recess forum. The use of the five dimensions in *participatory budgeting* as a comparison is one of the novelties in this research, because it will be able to see how democracy is in a procedural and pragmatic perspective (Cabannes, 2015) to substantial democracy (Cabannes and Lipietz, 2015; Cabannes, 2015). So, in an effort to understand the relationship between procedural and substantial dimensions, a theoretical framework is needed that can explain linearly, because the process in the recess forum will be bound by the dynamics that occur in politics (Rubin, 2020) then this research will discuss the results with the *Political of Budgetary Process Theory* (Wildavsky, 1984). Through the *Politics of Budgetary Process Theory*, it will be able to explain that public policy is not solely formed based on technical economic calculations, but a policy will be bound by the political dynamics that are happening.

Literature Review

The *political* theory of *Budgetary process* was proposed by Wildavsky (1984) a son of an immigrant from Ukraine who was born and grew up in Brooklyn New York Usa. The political theory of Budgetary process or often also referred to as the *theory of budgetary incrementalism* (Wehner, 2016). The political theory of budgetary process, *also known as* the theory of budgetary incrementalism (Wehner, 2016), initially provided a *challenge* to the traditional approach to the budget formulation process. In the process of determining the budget in the traditional view emphasizes that all public budgets are a gift from the government to the people, and is a kindness of the government, they assume that the government as an actor who knows all about public affairs (Yustika, 2020). In the view of Wildavsky (1984) that public budgets are not solely driven by economic factors, but are largely determined by political factors. In the traditional view, especially in *new public management*, economic aspects such as efficiency are decisive in the budget process, and assume that political dynamics are separate from the public administration process, but for Wildavsky "*Perhaps the 'study of budgeting' is just another expression for the 'study of politics'...*" through this approach Wildavsky argued that political dynamics are very decisive in understanding a budget policy can be done and understanding *resource allocation* cannot be understood without understanding politics and its processes (Wehner, 2016). It is then in the political arena that the assumption of *bounded rationality* is applied (Bendor and Bendor, 2010). The assumption of bounded *rationality* becomes an aspect that should be considered considering that the budget is characterized by "*extraordinary complexity*" where human capacity then

becomes very limited, to borrow Herbert Simon's term. (2020, 1983) in the budget process a political actor is only trying to *satisfy* rather than trying to *maximize* (Wildavsky, 1984).

Meanwhile, the dimensions of *Participatory budgeting* are a concept introduced by (Cabannes, 2015) as part of participatory democracy that can be carried out in the formulation of public policy. In general, in the *participatory budgeting* literature, research focuses on the determinants of participation (Manes-Rossi et al., 2023) while (Sintomer et al., 2010) discusses the ideal form of participation, then (Sintomer et al., 2010; Smith, 2010) related to the impact of the implementation of *Participatory Budgeting*, the next discusses *citizen engagement*. (Kasymova, 2017; Wijnhoven et al., 2015). Furthermore, (Dahan and Strawczynski, 2020) focus on the factors associated with the effectiveness of participation. According to Gilman (2016) there are four principles in *Participatory Budgeting* including: (1) direct citizen participation in decision-making processes and government oversight; (2) prevention of corruption through administrative and fiscal transparency; (3) improvement of urban infrastructure and services, especially helping the poor; and (4) renewal of political culture where citizens will function as agents of democracy. According to Cabanes (2015) *Participatory Budgeting* has 5 important dimensions including:

1. *Participatory Dimension*
2. *Financial Dimension*
3. *Territory Dimension*
4. *Legal and Regulatory Dimension*
5. *Political Dimension, Governance & Democracy*

In terms of institutional design, several studies on *participatory budgeting* have contributed, among others Cabanes (2015) who described the implementation of *participatory budgeting* in 25 cities in Latin America and Europe. *participatory budgeting* in a Global perspective. The study of Sintomer et al (Sintomer et al., 2010) which elaborates on the implementation of *participatory budgeting* in Europe. In Krenjova & Raudla (2018) several stages in *participatory budgeting* include: First, the elaboration of strategies, plans, legal actions that regulate the entire process in *participatory budgeting*. Usually done through *Brainstorm ideas*, Second, collecting proposals from participants, Third is the *decision making stage*, the last is the announcement of accepted proposals, as well as the determination of control and evaluation mechanisms.

Methods

This research is located in Banyuwangi Regency, at the institution of the Local House Of Representatives of Banyuwangi Regency and the place of recess implementation of Banyuwangi Regency Local House Of Representatives members. This research uses a qualitative descriptive approach using a natural context that aims to interpret and explain the phenomenon of *Participating Budgeting* (PB) through recess forums in Banyuwangi Regency with informants consisting of the Chairman of the Banyuwangi Regency Local House Of Representatives and Local House Of Representatives Members, Head of the Subdivision of Aspirations of the LOCAL Local House Of Representatives Regional Secretariat and Bappeda Banyuwangi Regency and Community Leaders, informants in this study were selected by *purposive sampling*, then the data in this study were obtained through interviews, observations and documentation studies, the data obtained were then analyzed qualitatively with an interactive model using the dimensions that characterize *Participatory Budgeting*.

Result

The implementation of the recess forum carried out by members of the Banyuwangi Regency Local House Of Representatives is part of a series of tasks related to the representation function, where the Local House Of Representatives as a people's representative body has the task of absorbing the aspirations of the people in the region in the form of public policies until finally obtaining budgeting support. In addition to the representation function, there are main functions of Local House Of Representatives, such as legislation, budgeting and control functions. To support the above functions, a member of Local House Of Representatives has a recess period, whose legal basis is regulated in Law No. 27/2009. Ideally, the recess forum should be used as an effective mechanism to absorb the aspirations of the community and to strengthen the function of Local House Of Representatives to carry out their legislative and budgetary functions, but often the recess forum cannot be implemented in a planned and ideal manner: Normatively, the budget proposal mechanism is regulated through the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation, as stated by the Head of Bappeda Banyuwangi in an interview conducted in 2023:

The mechanism for proposing the Jasmas budget or what is also called the Main Thoughts Local House of Representatives is regulated in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 86 of 2017 concerning Procedures for Planning, Controlling and Evaluating Regional Development, Procedures for Evaluating Draft Regional Regulations on Regional Long-Term Development Plans and Regional Medium-Term Development Plans, and Procedures for Amending Regional Long-Term Development Plans, Regional Medium-Term Development Plan, and Regional Government Work Plan, where in the preparation of the initial draft of the RKPD, the Main Thoughts

provides suggestions and opinions in the form of the main points of the Main Thoughts thoughts based on the results of recess / community aspirations as material for the formulation of activities, activity locations and target groups that are in line with the achievement of development targets set out in the Regional Regulation on RPJMD. Furthermore, the suggestions and opinions in the form of the Main Thoughts main ideas are submitted in writing to the head of BAPPEDA and *entered* in SIPD RI by Main Thoughts members according to their respective accounts to be processed in a series of stages in the preparation of the RKPD. (Wicaksono, 2023)

Internally in the Banyuwangi Regency Local House of Representatives institution, the recess forum is not specifically regulated, the only guidelines for implementing recess activities are regulated through the Main Thoughts rules of procedure, which are made at the beginning of the Banyuwangi Regency Main Thoughts term of office. This means that the Council's Standing Orders are only made once every five years. Based on interviews with Banyuwangi Main Thoughts Secretariat staff:

In Banyuwangi Main Thoughts, the recess mechanism is not specifically regulated, we adjust it to the Main Thoughts rules of procedure, there is no specific regulation on the recess mechanism, the rules of procedure only regulate that there is a recess every session period. (Mujani, 2023)

Although the rules of procedure of the Main Thoughts are general rules that regulate the recess forum conducted by Main Thoughts members, in practice the rules do not regulate how recess is conducted by Main Thoughts members. In general, the model used in recess is a general meeting with community members in each electoral district, in some recess activities community meetings are also interspersed with music, recitation and even folk art such as the art of leathered horse and so on. The presence of community members in the recess forum is also not specifically regulated, it all depends on the preferences of Local House of Representatives members. Usually, Local House of Representatives members will invite the success team of Local House of Representatives members and political party officials at the sub-district and village levels who were the success team during the elections. As stated by RL:

If usually the Local House of Representatives has to invite 100 people, I usually invite up to 250 people, and I have to feed them. I only invite my constituents. If I happen to invite them to the Village Office, then the Village Head and his officials are also invited, but if it's outside, I don't invite them, only my constituents. I also invite some local community leaders. The activity is two-way, after listening to my performance report, then the community submits proposals, not only about development proposals, but all community problems, proposals for school children, matters such as my child working in a company and then being dismissed and not given severance pay, so it's not just about buildings. (RL, 2023)

Interaction in the recess forum is strongly linked to the presence of a success team. The participation model associated with this relationship pattern is expected to provide electoral benefits at the time of the general election. It is not uncommon for the implementation of the recess forum ahead of the general election to be deliberately made for the purpose of gaining support again at the time of the general election. Based on observations, recess activities are closely tied to ongoing political dynamics. This is well recognised by Local House of Representatives members because they work within a political institution, so the process in the recess forum, in addition to official matters as Local House of Representatives members, cannot be avoided in order to maintain power and political support in elections. As stated by Local House of Representatives Banyuwangi member:

The recess forum is a forum provided for Local House of Representatives members, so it is indeed a very political forum, and the absence of rules about who will be invited to the recess, makes it possible for us to invite persons who will attend. For us, this recess activity is participatory from a political point of view, because if the Local House of Representatives members consist of various political parties in Banyuwangi and if all Local House of Representatives members carry out recess activities, it can provide an opportunity for the community to propose needs in each region. (FS, 2023)

Several stages in the Council's rules of procedure, based on some political interests that are only known by the Local House of Representatives leadership, cannot be implemented. One of the stages that should absolutely be implemented is the process of submitting the results of Local House of Representatives members' recess, which should be submitted in the Plenary Session as submitted by Local House of Representatives Banyuwangi members:

Indeed, the results of the recess of Local House of Representatives members were initially submitted through a plenary session, but for some reason it was not carried out anymore, of course with the absence of this plenary session we cannot find out the community's proposals made by other Local House of Representatives members (Interview, 2023).

Not all Local House of Representatives are aware of the submission stage, which should be used as a mechanism to synchronize programme proposals made during the recess forum, and the submission of recess results can also be used to determine how Local House of Representatives members carry out recess activities. The process of submitting programme proposals through the recess forum is usually handed directly Local House of Representatives expert staff to be inputted into the system that has been created.

The leadership of the Local House of Representatives in the process of preparing the Budget For Regional Revenue And Expenditure has a very strategic role, especially in relation to determining the budget allocations given to Local House of Representatives members, this

situation is the reason why the determination of how much the budget allocation is also not accessible to all Local House of Representatives members. The determination process can only be carried out by the Local House of Representatives leadership with the regional secretary and heads of departments in Banyuwangi Regency. There is no specific formulation of the amount of budget that can be allocated through the recess forum, it all depends on the dynamics and negotiations that can be carried out by the Local House of Representatives leadership and the executive. In the words of MJN, Regional Secretary of Banyuwangi Regency:

The process of determining the size of the budget requires communication with the Local House of Representatives leadership. Usually I also involve the heads of departments, then we discuss what is proposed by Local House of Representatives. For us, it doesn't matter, everything is for the benefit of the community....the important thing is not to make noise, we need stability to build, if we can accommodate each of them, everything will return to the people of Banyuwangi (Interview, 2023).

For the executive, this kind of political process is necessary, especially so that Local House of Representatives members can cooperate with the executive, especially to create stability in the implementation of government activities. Local House of Representatives members are usually informed in plenary sessions about the amount of budget allocation each member receives. In practice, each Local House of Representatives member does not receive the same budget allocation. The size of the budget allocation received by Local House of Representatives members is determined by the position held by the Local House of Representatives member, with Local House of Representatives leaders having a larger budget allocation than faction heads and ordinary members. According to MJ, Regional Secretary of Banyuwangi Regency:

There is no specific formulation of how much budget is allocated for Local House of Representatives members, of course everything is limited by the financial capacity of the region, at first I gave the opportunity to be as broad as possible, from there we can know the percentage value proposed by all Local House of Representatives members from the total budget. Every year, the value is around that figure, there is a reasonable increase...after all, everything will benefit the community (MJ, Interview April 2024).

The head of a faction also has a larger budget allocation than an ordinary member. The amount of responsibility that Local House of Representatives members have will have a significant impact on the budget allocations that are managed for their constituencies, especially to accommodate proposals for basic infrastructure projects from the people in each constituency. For Local House of Representatives members, it doesn't really matter how the budget negotiation process is carried out, the important thing is that every year the allocation Local House of

Representatives members increases, so this will provide space to fulfill political promises in the constituency, as stated by one member of Banyuwangi Local House of Representatives :

The first year in the Local House Of Representatives, starting in 2014, I still remember very well that my allocation was 600 million, and in 2016 it increased by 200 million so that each member became 800 million, until 2019 my allocation became 1.2 M. For today, it has been running for 2 years, my allocation has been 1.75M. The increasing value makes it easier for LOCAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES members to propose projects needed by the community. It's not enough, but with the bigger budget we can do more for the community (XX, 2022).

For Local House of Representatives members, the increase in development budget allocations through the Local House of Representatives every year is a 'blessing', especially for maintaining good relations with constituents or with success teams. With the increased budgetary space, there is room to fulfill political promises made during campaigns in each constituency. The more Local House of Representatives members are able to fulfill their campaign promises, the more space they will have to maintain relationships with community leaders. FS said that:

I focused on four sub-districts, and more on my mass base areas. I have a map of the gains in each area in the four sub-districts of my Dapil. That's where I worked on some of the infrastructure that the community really needed. Because this is a political issue, the assistance cannot be separated because there is a five-year relationship during the elections. I need to win so I have to give the best for the people who have elected me." (FS, 2023)

The realization of public budgeting through recess forums is closely related to political issues, especially for the five-year political agendas, namely the General Election. In the run-up to the general election, the patterns of interaction between politicians and the community will be more intense, with a short gap between the general election and the general election. Therefore, proposals for development projects can be used to strengthen the political position of Local House of Representatives members in the community. The community has developed a pattern that if a Local House of Representatives member rarely provides assistance to the community, the political punishment is not to vote for him or her in the general election. A similar sentiment was expressed by FN, a member of Banyuwangi's Local House of Representatives from the Party with the Mercedes Benz logo:

In every region I have trusted people, even in certain sub-districts I have from the beginning had a commitment with the Village Head. At the time of recess I was also supported by them, of course the logical reward is that I must be won in this next election (2024). In the previous election, I received significant votes. Inshallah, proposals through recess are much more effective than through Development Planning Deliberation (FN, 2023).

Every member of the Local House of Representatives has a tendency to conduct recesses for political purposes, for his or her party or for his or her own interests. In each region, each Local House of Representatives member usually has people who are an extension of his or her interests in the community. These people come from within the political party, or from influential community leaders in the neighborhood. Approaches to community leaders through material rewards in the form of development projects or other material rewards are used by Local House of Representatives members to influence community members. Usually, Local House of Representatives members already have a political map during the general elections, and the distribution of votes in each area has been used as a tool to redistribute public support through development projects for community infrastructure. Of course, intense interaction between Local House of Representatives members is also very important to keep constituents from turning away in the general election.

Discussion

Based on the analysis of the findings obtained during the research, the focus is on analyzing the process that occurred during the recess forum conducted by members of the Banyuwangi Regency Local House of Representatives. When referring to the dimensions of Participatory Budgeting, the recess forum process is very different from *participatory budgeting* (Bateman, 2020). The process of *participatory budgeting* is designed with a technocratic concept that involves procedures and substance in democracy in one framework. This can be seen from the dimensions that exist in *participatory budgeting*; there is a very close relationship between procedure and substance. *Participatory Dimension, Financial Dimension, Territory Dimension, Legal and Regulatory Dimension* are more procedural, while *Political Dimension, Governance and Democracy* are more visible as the implementation of procedural democracy.


Meanwhile, the recess forum is a process designed by a political institution, namely the Local House of Representatives, so that all processes carried out are very political, meaning that the budgeting process through the recess forum is always surrounded by the political interests of existing political actors. In the perspective of (Knight, 1992) political actors in either the legislature or the executive as well as bureaucratic officials have their own interests. They have preferences that are closely related to political power, as well as other material benefits. Almost all dimensions in *participatory budgeting* cannot be implemented in the recess forum. There is only one dimension, namely the territorial dimension, which has similarities with the measures used in the recess forum (Septalinda et al., 2023). While other dimensions such as the *Participatory Dimension, Financial Dimension, Legal and Regulatory Dimension* which are more

procedural in nature will always be tied to the political dynamics that are happening. Meanwhile, the *Political Dimension, Governance & Democracy*, which is more visible as a procedural implementation of democracy, will be strongly related to the results associated with the four previous dimensions. If the implementation in the *Participatory Dimension, Financial Dimension, Legal and Regulatory Dimension* is in accordance with the existing procedures during the recess forum, the political dimension, governance and democracy will be good, and vice versa if the procedure side cannot be implemented, the practice will automatically have an impact on the governance and democracy side.

In terms of operate in the *public choice theory* approach, the political actors involved cannot only accuse members of the Local House of Representatives, the executive (Regent) and the bureaucracy as the actors most responsible for the creation of a good democracy, but we must be able to see in two perspectives where from the supply side or the supply side means that the actors involved in policy formulation consist of members of the Local House of Representatives, the executive (Regent) and the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, from the demand side, the political actors involved consist of *voters* and interest groups in the community (Yustika, 2008). One example based on the findings, one very important dimension is the participation dimension in *participatory budgeting*. In practice, the dimension of participation in the recess forum is determined by the current political dynamics. The participation dimension in *participatory budgeting* is a very decisive dimension, especially because it contains inclusive citizen involvement that will determine accountability and deepening democracy in *participatory budgeting*, but what happens in the recess forum is that the participation model is *clientilist* (*clientelism participatory*).

Figure 1.

Conceptual Framework of Recess Forum Budgeting



From this side, according to the *political* theory of *Budgetary process* put forward by Wildavsky (1984), which positions the process in the recess forum is very much tied to the political dynamics that are happening. To get the desired policy, *voters* and interest groups try to manage their resources to get the expected benefits. Meanwhile, the executive and legislative try to utilize the policies made to seek public support during the election process. So Wildavsky (1984) sees that in every policy made, it will always be tied to the political behaviors that are happening. In this approach, a public budget is made not only in relation to the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy made, but must be seen as an *equilibrium point* of competing interests. One of the mechanisms for reconciling competing interests is through the distribution of incentives from various institutions, so in order to obtain an *equilibrium point*, the public budget process is not seen merely as the most efficient and effective choice for the common good, but is the most optimal choice of the various interests that exist.

Wildavsky's approach (1984) Wildavsky's approach opposes the *conventional welfare* maximization-based public policy model, which assumes that the State is autonomous and exogenous, positioning State policies to always be oriented towards the public interest (Yustika, 2008). The state is the actor who knows best about the needs of society and they act solely to fulfill the needs of the public, and do not have their own interests. The actions they take are solely on the basis of benevolent values for the prosperity of their people. Thus Wildavsky (1984) sees that public policy is not born in a vacuum (Fardian et al., 2024). A policy emerges in political dynamics that bring together various interests.

Conclusion

The recess forum is a forum for members of the Banyuwangi Local House of Representatives a forum that is carried out by legislative members, normatively the implementation of the recess forum is an activity that is closely tied to the functions of legislative members, namely legislation, budgeting and control. Thus the implementation of the recess forum, especially in relation to the proposal of budgets and public expenditure through the recess forum, cannot be implemented as the implementation of *participatory budgeting* in Brazil, because in practice the processes that occur in the recess forum will always be tied to the political dynamics that occur and are used by Local House of Representatives members as a medium for *welfare distribution* to their supporters during elections.

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