Compliance and Conflict of Value in Public Policy Implementation: Comparison between the New Order and the Reformation Era

Dwiyanto Indiahono[1]
Erwan Agus Purwanto[2]
Agus Pramusinto[3]

Abstract

This research aims to examine differences in the relationship of bureaucratic and political officials during the New Order (Soeharto's era) and the Reformation (post-Soeharto) era within the arena of public policy implementation. This is a matter of importance given that there is a change in relations between the two from integration in the New Order to bureaucratic impartiality in the Reformation Era. This study attempts to answer the question: How were the relations of bureaucratic and political officials in the implementation of local level public policy during the New Order and the Reformation Era? A qualitative research has been conducted in Tegal Municipality using the following data collection techniques: interview, focus group discussion, documentation, and observation. Tegal Municipality was selected as the study location because of the unique relationship shown between the mayor and the bureaucracy. Its uniqueness lies in the emergence of bureaucratic officials who dare to oppose political officials, based on their convictions that bureaucratic/public values should be maintained even if it means having to be in direct conflict with political officials. This research indicates that the relationship between bureaucratic and political officials in the arena of local level policy implementation during the New Order was characterized as being full of pressure and compliance, whereas during the Reformation Era bureaucrats have the audacity to hinder policy implementation. Such audacity to thwart policies is considered to have developed from a stance that aims to protect public budget and values in policies. The occurring conflict of values here demonstrates a dichotomy of political and bureaucratic officials that is different from the prevailing definition of politics-administration dichotomy introduced at the onset of Public Administration studies.

Keywords:

compliance; conflict; values; political; bureaucratic officials

Introduction

In the New Order, bureaucrats and political officials were not distinctly distinguishable. This is due to the reality at the time that the bureaucracy had become the power of the government through its engagement as a member of *Golongan Karya* (Golkar), wherein Golkar itself was a party

[1] Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada
  Email: dwiyanto.indiahono@mail.ugm.ac.id

[2] Corresponding Author, Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada
  Email: erwan@ugm.ac.id

[3] Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

that constantly reigned victorious in every General Election held during the New Order. Political officials and the bureaucracy at all levels in the line ministries and regions were indistinguishable as to when one would be called a bureaucrat or a political official. The integration between the bureaucracy and political officials had subsequently led to a harmonious state in the domain of policy formulation and implementation.

In terms of policy formulation by bureaucratic and political officials, at the local level they did not have substantial authority to design policies. According to the principal-agent concept, the principal is the person or entity that gives mandate to the agent to carry out a task within the corridors and provisions determined by the principal. Bureaucratic and political officials at the local level in the New Order era did not play the role of principal as they were the agent of the central government in the regions instead. Political officials did not have extensive authority, which resulted in minimal budget allocation and low creativity and innovation capacity in designing policies. Additionally, in terms of policy implementation, local political officials would push bureaucratic officials in the region to always succeed in implementing policies. Success in policy implementation was a main requirement to maintain one's official position.

Eventually, the New Order was toppled and this ushered in the Reformation Era. The Reformation Era has examined the radical change in the relation of bureaucratic and political officials both at the central and local levels. The bureaucracy at the very early stage of the Reformation Era had been returned to its original position to being impartial (non-partisan). Such position has allowed the bureaucracy to no longer become the political machine of those in power, it is entitled to develop public values and public administration ethics in a more independent manner. The bureaucracy's position is further strengthened with the advent of Law No. 5/2014 on Civil Service, which drives the bureaucracy into a more independent level and more oriented toward a merit system.

The relation of bureaucrats and political officials in the Reformation Era at the local level is, thus, an interesting subject of study. The bureaucracy that had once been integrated with political officials, has undergone change in the Reformation Era as it is now a dichotomy between bureaucratic and political officials. Such relational change will undoubtedly have ramifications in the arena of policy formulation and implementation. Policy values, which were initially indistinguishable between those of bureaucrats and those of political officials, should be more clearly comprehensible post-reform.

The bureaucracy's independence post-reform at the local level in terms of policy implementation in the Reformation Era is an interesting case to study in Tegal Municipality because the relation of bureaucratic and political officials there indicates a prevalent disharmony between the two. This was demonstrated with Tegal Municipality's civil servants having the audacity to criticize their mayor in the form of protests held from the month of April through May of 2015. Tegal's civil servants felt that there had been abuse of power by arrogant political officials in the form of excessive political intervention in matters of public administration. In the case of the protests by Tegal's civil servants, the Mayor responded by discharging 14 officials, which consisted of 9 Echelon II personnel and 5 echelon III personnel, from their post, this was subsequently followed by firing the Director of the Tegal Municipality PDAM (State-Owned Water Company) who delivered a speech during the protests (Firdaus, 2015; Nugroho, 2015).

The disharmonious condition between the bureaucratic and political officials in Tegal Municipality consequently leads to a question of utmost importance, namely: How were the relations between bureaucratic and political officials in policy implementation during

the New Order and the Reformation Era in Tegal Municipality? This is an interesting question to pursue and study as it may reveal the bureaucracy's position within the implementation arena in the New Order and post-bureaucratic impartiality in the Reformation Era, as well as reveal what would the bureaucracy do when there are opposing values between bureaucratic values and policy values desired by political officials.

Methods

This research was conducted by employing the qualitative approach. Data collection was carried out through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, documentation, and observations. In-depth interviews were conducted with 28 respondents considered as having the capacity to elaborate the relations of bureaucratic and political officials in implementing policies since the New Order until the Reformation Era in Tegal Municipality. The 28 respondents comprised of ten Echelon II officials, seven Echelon III officials, four Echelon IV officials, Chairperson of PWRI (Retired Civil Servants' Association), Chairperson of DPRD (Regional People's Representative Assembly), two former mayors, a former vice-mayor, a ruling mayor, and a staff of BKD (Regional Personnel Agency). Focus group discussions (FGDs) were also held by involving Echelon II officials on three separate occasions. The first FGD was attended by five Echelon II officials, the second FGD was attended by three Echelon II officials, and the third FGD was attended by three Echelon II officials and an Echelon III personnel. In addition to conducting in-depth interviews and FGDs, certain documents were also obtained and used as secondary data in this research, which were Tegal Municipality's RPJMD (Regional Mid-Term Development Plan), Map of Tegal Municipality, and Statistics on Tegal Municipality. Observations of bureaucratic activities following the tension between political officials and career bureaucrats in Tegal Municipality were also carried out in order to investigate deeper into the relations occurring between bureaucratic and political officials in the municipality.

The data analysis process began by analyzing all the available data and the various resources, namely the interviews, formal documents, personal documents, figures, and so forth (Moleong, 1990). Once data had been collected in the form of interview and FGD recordings with transcriptions, as well as the notes from observation results, data check and compilation were conducted. When data was still considered insufficient after conducting data check and compilation, the researchers would return to the field to obtain the necessary data.

The collected data were then reduced merely into data that are relevant with the focus of study and selected as references in data analysis. Once the data have been reduced, it was subsequently classified according to the focus of study. The reduced data were then triangulated by verifying FGD/interview results with FGDs/interviews; FGDs/interviews with documents; and FGDs/interviews with observation results. The data is then presented in the form of narratives and case boxes in accordance with the focus of study. The result of triangulation is subsequently considered as a conclusion. The data analysis activities carried out in this research were made to fulfill the criteria of interactive data analysis proposed by Miles and Huberman (1992), which include three main components of data analysis, which are: data reduction; data presentation; and conclusion.

Relational Patterns of Bureaucratic and Political Officials in Public Policy Implementation: Compliance and Conflict of Value

Weber and Hegel stated that one of Public Administration's attributes is that the political figure stands at the apex of leadership

(Shaw, 1992). This confirms that there are two distinct powers in the bureaucracy: the political power that is based on constituency and the bureaucratic power that is based on skills. Political officials who develop their accountability to the electorates will strive for the maximum benefit possible for the sake of their voters. Whereas career bureaucrats develop their accountability to their professional colleagues, to the wider public and to the extent that their efforts achieve organizational objectives (Alesina & Tabellini, 2007). Thus, even in the domain of implementation, bureaucratic officials must resiliently maintain alignment with their public values.

A complementarity relationship where one complements another will happen when the level of control exercised by political officials and the level of neutrality exhibited by career officials (administrators) are high. At such level, political officials will take heed of the administration's competence and commitment, while administrators will be committed to become more accountable and responsive. Political officials and career officials can complement each other, depend on each other, and reciprocally influence one another. This is achieved by maintaining their distinctive roles based on their unique perspectives and values. Both political and career officials must understand the differences of their formal positions and admit that at times they may well overlap (Svara, 2001).

Dunn and Legge Jr. (2002) opine that there are three approach models pertaining to the relationship between elected bureaucrats and career bureaucrats, namely: the orthodox politic-administration dichotomy; the modified orthodox politic-administration dichotomy; and the partnership model. The relational patterns between political and career officials in the classical school of administration tends to separate the politic and administration arenas. The political arena is truly the purview

of political officials, while career officials are those responsible for implementing policies (implementers). This school is known as the orthodox public administration school of thought. It has subsequently developed into the modified orthodox public administration school, which tries to provide more space for career officials to design policies in areas where political officials lack the capacity to do so. Fox and Jordan (2011) state that the task delegation by political actors to the bureaucracy is indeed carried out, theoretically, by politicians as it allows them to shy away from full responsibility of policies that lessen voters' interest. Politicians would not delegate if the policy is aligned with the voters' interest. Concerning the question of whether delegation has negative impacts on the public, the answer depends on to what extent should bureaucratic expertise be exerted to make up for the politicians' lack of discipline. The last school of thought, known as the contemporary approach, is the partnership school, which positions political and career officials as partners in their efforts of fulfilling public interests, drafting pro-public policies, and more satisfying provision of public services.

Different to the opinions of Dunn and Legge Jr. (2002), based on the literature search, three main approaches concerning the relational pattern of political and career officials were found. The three approaches are: the political control approach; the bureaucratic autonomy approach; and the partnership approach. The control approach believes that political officials must have control over career officials. This is the most dominant approach in the study of relational patterns between political and career officials, so it is no surprise that it has developed into numerous variants. The bureaucratic autonomy approach considers career officials as beings that possess professional expertise and are capable of responding to the public via policies and public services. In order to properly implement public policies and

deliver public services, career officials must be positioned as independent beings, unrestricted by political and external interventions. The third approach, partnership, believes in an equivalent relation between political and career officials in administering public affairs. Such equivalent relation would allow for public interests to be discussed more massively and properly by both political and career officials. The bureaucrats' proportion of impartiality and politicians' political control become unique points that should be considered in developing partnership between career and political officials.

The classical perspective considers that task of public bureaucracy as purely instrumental as it relates to the efforts of making more efficient program and policy implementation (Dobuzinskis, 1997). The Classic Public Administration school believes that career officials are not entitled to give value and they are merely implementing officers. As a consequence, career officials must remain neutral in policy implementation and they have no responsibility of having to be "accountable" to the public. Bureaucratic officials are only responsible to political officials, and it is political officials who are accountable to the public. Bureaucratic officials are a neutral entity that cannot be demanded to be more in favor of the public, because they are solely accountable to their superior the political officials. Career officials in the Classical Public Administration School, thus, adhere to a doctrine of mono-loyalty, which is the single loyalty and absolute compliance career officials have toward political officials.

Public Administration scholars who prioritizes the efficiency value have been criticized because they are considered to have let Public Administration become an underdeveloped field of study. The next generation of Public Administration scholars have subsequently attempted to take administration into the domain of political

science studies. They are of the opinion that Public Administration should intermingle with politics to discuss about policies. The implementers who possess numerous experiences in policy must play a role in policymaking. Public Administration should discuss about procedural and substantial policies to produce good policies (Waldo, 1952; Simon et al., 1952; Harmon, 1989). Such developing Public Administration value has led Adams (1992) to argue that Public Administration should have two dimensions: the political dimension and the epistemological dimension. These two dimensions will bear consequences on Public Administration's nature of having to be open to every scientific study. When Public Administration is required to have a clear locus and focus (Golembiewski, 1974; Henry, 1975; Daneke, 1990), the developing public values may become a reference and a substantial part in the efforts of defining Public Administration as a significant science (Kirkhart, 1984; Jun, 1993; Pesch, 2008; Riccucci, 2010).

The debate regarding value gained considerable traction following the first Minnowbrook Conference in 1968 which included social justice as a value that should be incorporated in Public Administration and policy formulation. Ethics, honesty, and accountability in governance should become the lexicons of Public Administration. The Minnowbrook perspective argues that when societal needs change, public institutions often last longer than they're intended to (Frederickson, 1989). New Public Administration was, thus, created to direct public organizations to be more oriented toward the citizens instead of the bureaucracy (Frederickson, 1975; Cruise, 1997). The first Minnowbrook Conference brought about three themes of substantial changes on social justice, ethics, and citizen participation (Esquith, 1997). The second Minnowbrook Conference was rather similar, social justice value was

still a warm topic of discussion, which was complemented with issues of reconciling Public Administration with democracy, ethics, and human relations.

Public administration values have, thus, developed from what was initially limited to effectiveness and efficiency, with the value of social justice. The addition of social justice value had compelled Public Administration to be sensitive to the public. It needs to find a balance between demands of competitive performance and enforcement of values of justice, equality, and accountability (Cohen & Gershgoren, 2013). Values in Public Administration have continued to develop, resulting in the suggestion of making happiness as a value that should be developed by Public Administration in the future (Okulicz-kozaryn, 2016).

Rutgers (2015) posits that "public values are enduring beliefs in the organization of and activities in a society that are regarded as crucial or desirable—positively or negatively—for the existence, functioning, and sustainability of that society—instant or distant—the well-being of its members—directly or indirectly--, and present and/or future—in reference to an—implicit or explicit—encompassing normative ideal of human society". Whereas Bozeman (2007, p. 13) expounds that public values of a society are those that provide normative consensus regarding (a) the rights, benefit, and prerogatives citizens should (and should not) be entitled to; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, state, and one another; and (c) principles that the governments and policies should be based upon. When the bureaucracy faces a rule violating a higher objective, or if there were conflicting rules, or if they had discretionary space, civil servants must make choices appropriate to public values (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard & Musheno, 2003). The personal values of the bureaucracy in the implementation domain have increased the opportunity for them to find their own

intellectual space and influence the character and quality of implementation available in local communities (O'Sullivan, 2016). The structure and process of policy implementation must interact and reflect the values and beliefs of implementers (Ryan, 1999).

The Reformation Era has brought about the freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Dahl (1998) states that there are six political institutions required in a democracy, one of them is freedom of expression. Freedom of expression includes the critical attitude that career officials demonstrate concerning public interests, and concerning the policies of political officials. Political actors sitting at the peak of bureaucracy feel that they are the ones afforded with legitimate sovereignty to manage bureaucrats. Whereas bureaucrats feel that in the era of democracy they are entitled to demonstrate their accountability directly to the public, by channeling their aspirations openly, despite having to oppose the peak leadership of the bureaucracy (political official) in their region. Such conflict between political and career officials subsequently leads to a precarious situation wherein career officials become inefficient and political officials become unresponsive (Karl, 1987).

The professionalism of administrators is also mentioned in the discussion on the relationship between political and career officials. When an administrator is required to be professional, the necessary criteria are education, competence, appropriateness of action with code of ethics, and experience. Meanwhile, public administrators should also carry a mission of public interest (Kearney & Sinha, 1988). The middle way is by placing importance on responsiveness and professionalism in the design and operation of a democratic bureaucracy in which each requires constant maintenance (Rourke, 1992 & 1960). Toren (1976) shows proof that the relation of bureaucracy and professionalism may be classified into two general

categories: (a) structural hierarchy shows that organizations possessing hierarchical authority and professional expertise not only can coexist within organizations but they can also form variations together; and (b) rules in the bureaucracy are not always violated by prevailing professional and pro-public oriented values. In the European Parliament case, in certain conditions the European Parliament officials play a substantial role to direct the decision-making process in European Union (Neuhold & Dobbels, 2015). The officials may have significant impact on the policy-making process, and this phenomenon refutes the dualistic Weberian approach that distinguishes politicians as decision makers and officials as executors.

The Reformation Era has ushered in new and extraordinary impacts indicated by bolder bureaucrats who are open to reveal the differences in the values they and the political leaders hold. This has led to a vulnerability to conflict between political officials and career officials in the Reformation Era. This has been proven when an intense conflict occurs about a particular issue between the professional bureaucrats and political actors, there are lobbying efforts conducted by interest groups not only to political actors, but to professional bureaucrats as well (McKay, 2011).

Citizens in the era of democracy and sophisticated information technology gain information on outcome, performance, and behavior of politicians (political leaders) through the media (including the internet, TV, radio), through private hearings and collective assemblies. This are manifestations of political officials' accountability to citizens. Concurrently, public sector organizations (career officials) promotes accountability by allowing the public to participate at certain levels in the decision-making process (Monfardini, 2010). Greitens (2012) has also brought back the discussion on multiple accountability, which is an issue and challenge for the bureaucracy. The

bureaucracy is currently under the pressure of multiple accountability, such as legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional accountabilities simultaneously.

The Contemporary Public Administration School believes that career officials, aside from maintaining their loyalty to political officials, are also required to remain loyal to the public in policy formulation and implementation. Dual loyalty in this modern bureaucracy is surely influenced by on-going democratization and good governance, which urges governments to be more transparent, accountable, and responsive. Career officials required to serve the two undoubtedly have difficulties in making it work. Career officials must be able to link both interests: political officials' aspirations and public aspirations. Political officials' aspirations (instructions) loaded with political contents and debts are frequently different from public aspirations. In the public policy stage, the bureaucracy must be able to demonstrate its allegiance to public values and employ its professionalism to compose policies capable of addressing public issues. Schnose (2015) found that bureaucratic professionalism can partly explain the change of allocation for "ideological" budget category and its positive correlation with policy stability the world over.

The Bureaucracy's Compliance in the Implementation Arena of the New Order

The bulk of political and bureaucratic officials' work in the regions pertained to implementing programs mandated by the central government. The bureaucratic and political officials' relationship during the New Order, thus, illustrates a government ruling with an iron fist. The central government pressured the subnational governments to be able to implement the programs, then the political officials at the regional level pressured the regional bureaucracy to implement central policies. Sensible dialogs between bureaucrats and political officials in the regions to produce a

more innovative and creative policy formulation or programs did not take place during the New Order. The subnational governments merely implemented the policies of the central government.

The relationship between bureaucratic and political officials had consequently become unfit as the regional governments were responsible to the central government for implementing its programs, resulting in political officials in the regions putting pressures on their subordinates to constantly succeed in every program and policy. This had led to policies becoming mere lip service in order for regional bureaucratic officials to be safe from the pressures applied by regional political officials, and regional political officials being safe from the pressures of political officials in the central government. This subsequently resulted in data that "*asal bapak senang*" (keep the boss happy). The relation of bureaucratic and political officials in the New Order can, thus, be described as being relatively one-sided, there was no discussion conducted by policy actors to explore public policies more sensitive to the people's needs.

Upon observing this phenomenon with the concept of dichotomy or integration of bureaucratic and political officials, we will find that the constellation of bureaucratic and political officials during the New Order indicates an integration of bureaucratic and political officials. However, the integration of these officials was not in terms of coming to an agreement in designing public policies relatively more sensitive to the people, but what had occurred was an integration of bureaucratic and political officials depicting an authoritarian regime. A regime in which the bureaucracy had become incapable of demonstrating its professionalism and political officials were pressured not to make their vision and mission into a reality, but to focus their efforts more on serving the central government instead.

The relation of bureaucratic and political officials in the New Order reinforces the assertion that many political officials have been conducting political control over the bureaucracy by two means: first is by counter staffs and second is by managerialism (Sukmajati, 2013). The former means, counter staff, has been discussed in the previous passages, as for managerialism, the New Order regime had succeeded in controlling the bureaucracy by pressuring it to remain in their arena as policy implementers and not as an entity that should be entitled to the opportunity, due to their professionalism, experience, and technocratic skills, to design policies. Once political officials succeed in applying managerialism, bureaucratic officials become incapable of designing public policy. This was the situation prevalent in the New Order, it was a time when the bureaucratic officials were merely managers of policy implementers instead of playing a role as think tanks producing public policy analyses at the local level.

The New Order phenomenon above is quite different from the concept introduced by initiators of the principal agent theory. The principal agent theory shows that there are principals and agents (implementers) within governments. The phenomenon happening at the local level during the New Order could not illustrate that, because the political officials in the regions were agents of the central government that constantly acted as the principal. Since the regional governments acted as agents, they consequently did not have enough space to operate as a principal. Hence, when political officials were positioned as principals at the regional level, they were unable to conduct matters beyond their authority. The New Order period can, thus, be described as a time when regional political officials were agents of the central government who played the role of the principal.

This is almost similar to other countries, for regional public administration to be regarded of decent quality, then it should have a

high level of integrity to the central government. Such integrity to the central government is exercised in order to increase the public's trust in actions taken by the regional government. The locally elected officials must truly obey the legal regime that regulates conflict of interests and incompatibility, if this were disregarded by the political officials, they will be at risk of being declared incompatible with the government and there will be clash of interests. In Romania, the administrative authority ensures the compliance of locally elected officials to legal provisions, and conflict of interests are managed by an institution named National Integrity Agency (Apostolache, 2015).

When we analyze the relation of bureaucratic and political officials using the concept of political control, it can be construed that after political officials succeeded in rendering the bureaucrats into mere managers, the New Order also succeeded in comprehending the concept of political control while they were using the concept of bureaucratic insulation as a shield so the bureaucracy could not be easily intervened by political actors aside from Golkar. Mono loyalty of personnel was a very effective means of maintaining the New Order's public policy. This can, for instance, be observed in the 'yellowization' (*kuningisasi*) program during the New Order in Central Java, where no one complained and no one discussed it as a political color. This was easily justified as the mascot of Central Java is the golden orioles which is yellow in color, so it was not highly unusual for all walls to be painted yellow. When this policy was implemented, it could almost be assured that the regional government and the bureaucracy were safe from any counter policy. No one dared to mention that it could not be done.

During the New Order, the political control exerted by the mayor upon the bureaucracy was strictly implemented. The bureaucracy at the time had truly become Golkar's political

machine. The bureaucracy would ensure that all the civil servants elected Golkar and actively assist in winning its campaign in every election. The main characteristic of political officials' political control over the bureaucracy during the New Order was the inseparability of bureaucratic and political officials. This resulted in a strict monitoring order that added another pressure to the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy had to work optimally to show that the ruling regime is really capable of implementing policies for the sake of providing welfare and prosperity to the people. When development policies implemented by a mayor and the bureaucracy were declared successful, Golkar would reap benefit from that. Mayors were, thus, significantly concerned with the prestige of policy implementations conducted in their region. Massive pressures were a necessity to ensure that all policies run within the determined path, particularly since all aspects of development policies during the New Order tended to be national development programs centrally designed by the national government.

This is in line with the findings of McVey (1982) who states that the New Order bureaucracy is similar to the style of the Dutch East Indies Colonial government in the 1930s. The Dutch East Indies had at the time introduced development, efficiency, and modern principles. The bureaucracy of that period illustrates *Beambtenstaat*, which is similar to the concept of bureaucracy polity introduced by Rigss and characterized by insulating the policy-making process from a process of broad public participation (through representation), and putting more emphasis on the bureaucracy. This was made possible due to the presence of exceedingly substantial power and political demobilization.

The integration of bureaucratic and political officials during the New Order does not depict an ideal condition illustrating their unity in designing pro public policies,

what we have observed here is a deviant form of integration. The deviant integration demonstrates the union of bureaucratic and political officials in the regions acting as agents of the central government that acted as the principal. The relation between the regional government (bureaucratic and political officials of the regional government) and the central government during the New Order was similar to the relation between the federal government and the states in a federation (Hedge et al., 1991). The model in "*An Expanded Principal-Agent Model of Regulatory Federalism* describes how most of the states' policy formulations are actually intervened by federal government's policies. The subnational governments in the New Order era also went through similar experience when many of their policy formulations (authorities) were intervened or directed by the central government. This kind of relationship is indeed beneficial to the federal (central) government because it ensures (controls) the state's interests to be implemented properly by the subnational governments. Meanwhile, this is absolutely unfavorable to the states (regional governments) because they do not have sufficient space to formulate policies that are "authentically" local, and the capacity of policy makers in the regions are not honed to design good policies.

If bureaucratic and political officials were to truly realized the principal-agent relation, they should have been able to refine their selves to become exceptional individuals. This is because, in a principal-agent relationship, the agent should comprise of individuals possessing excellent skills in policy design. Zhang et al. (2012, p. 194) reveal the most necessary skills and knowledge to be an agent (manager) in policy making, namely: a) communication skills that include listening, developing compromise and consensus, writing, and face-to-face communication; b) financial management and budgeting skills;

c) information technology skills; d) regional government structure; e) research and analytical capacity; f) ethical practice competence; g) human resource management skills; and h) strategic planning and management skills.

Demir and Nyhan (2008) assert that neutral competence has a negative impact on democratic accountability and only partly explains planning capacity. Meanwhile, elected officials admit the substantial role of subordinates in public administration. Whereas political guidelines have no significant impact on the planning capacity of public administrators. Political guidelines play a greater role in terms of legitimizing policy initiatives and amendments once a policy has been implemented with the help of administrators.

Conflict of Value between the Bureaucracy and Political Officials in Policy Implementation during the Reformation Era before the Civil Service Law

It is indeed an interesting matter when the bureaucracy complains about a policy. This commonly occurs in the domain of policy implementation. When a policy has been seized by political officials, bureaucratic officials would on occasion intentionally delay or even attempt to thwart said policy. An official shared a story when she/he was a section head during Mayor Ikmal Jaya's term in office. She/he intentionally delayed the mayor's instruction because she/he considered that it was something well beyond the standard ethics of bureaucracy and was dangerous to him/herself, the mayor, and the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was concerned that if it were to submit to the political official, then it would have become a substantial risk to him/herself and the political official. This had given him/her the courage to delay. He admitted to being summoned and reprimanded specifically by the mayor since his/her efforts to delay the policy was found out by the mayor through

a leak made by his/her subordinate. This was the Bokong Semar case, which had ultimately brought the mayor to be placed behind bars.

Concerning this case, the bureaucracy had internally conveyed a warning that what the Mayor was about to do could be extremely dangerous if continued further. He/she stated that the mayor's policy had been stalled for nearly a year. This is what political officials call "bureaucratic stalling". The bureaucracy stalls by saying "yes", while actually "not doing anything". To political officials, this is considered as insubordination (bureaucratic insubordination), yet to the bureaucracy this is a means for them to play nice in the face of political officials, wherein the existing condition does not allow bureaucratic officials to go against the political officials' policies. Civil servants can never only be the 'servants' of 'political bosses' because they carry out highly significant measures in the execution of public authority or in the development and implementation of public policies. The loyalty of civil servants is by no means similar to the loyalty an employee would commonly afford to the employer (Sossin, 2005).

Modern public administrators, particularly in the context of impartial civil servants, are often accused of being insubordinate to elected politicians. This is partly influenced by the literature on New Public Management which opines that today's public administrators must ensure quality services, provide value to public budget, be responsive, operate strategically, uphold organization's reputation, and so forth. These are the reason why they seem to serve many masters, not only politicians, but also various interests that are aligned at times and quite frequently oppose one another (Graaf, 2011). Administrators attempting to stall policy implementation merely consider that the removal of the program would be more beneficial than its implementation. In relation to this, administrators also serve as the savior of taxpayers' money or the savior of public budget. Drometer's (2012) research indicates that the bureaucracy holds a significant role in public budgeting. The study shows that bureaucrats have a unique influence because they favor (prioritize) numerous supply of public goods thereby increasing investment

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Case 1.
Officials of the Reformation Era (Pre Civil Service Law)
Stalling Policy Implementation

Official B4 stated that the political official had instructed to implement a policy that deviated beyond the path of public values. The bureaucracy, as the more experienced party, would naturally find out whether the policy violates the rules. Once it had been understood that the policy is a violation, the bureaucracy would provide counsel to cease its implementation. Nevertheless, according to B4, the political official had frequently exercised his/her discretion regarding the matter. While in fact, exercising discretion is acceptable given that it does not violate rules or regulations. When the political official had stated that the policy is at his/her discretion and that it should be continued, the bureaucracy could, according to B4, stall the policy because it opposed ethics of public administration. B4 said that he/she and the Regional Secretary had stalled the policy concerning the Bokong Semar land swap, which ultimately ended with Mayor Ikmal Jaya being put on trial and convicted in court. B4 was even summoned specifically by the Mayor and reprimanded for having stalled the policy. The requirement that the land appraiser should be from an independent organization was not met.
The land price inflated and the Bokong Semar case had caused, according to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), around eight billion rupiahs' loss to the state.

Source: Result of interview with Informant B4 and research documentation.

expenditure, hopefully this has an impact on the efforts to restrict politicians' latitude and thwart their rent seeking attempts.

In addition, this demonstrates the vital role administrators play in policy implementation. Policy implementation transforms policy strategies and goals into daily operation activities (McCurley III, 1979). Street level organizations are crucial players in making public policies. The importance of these organizations is reflected in the new public management strategy that aims to influence how street level organizations operate, partly, by "directing" discretionary practices through performance based incentives. The underlying assumption is that if the performance indicator provides a baseline and equal incentive (or fine), a person can assign policy implementation to street level organizations so they can determine the best means of executing the said policy (Brodkin, 2011).

At the initial period of the Reformation Era, there had been indications of the bureaucracy defying the efforts of political officials who went beyond the path of regional government. These are good indications, namely the enthusiasm to maintain the bureaucracy remains on the right track, the track of keeping the regional government's integrity and accountability. These seeds will become good investments to confront truly arrogant political officials.

Conflict of Value between Bureaucratic and Political Officials in Policy Implementation during the Reformation Era after the Civil Service Law

The relationship between bureaucratic and political officials following the adoption of the Civil Service Law in Tegal Municipality in public policy was also indicated with phenomena of bureaucratic officials intentionally stalling policy implementation. The bureaucratic stalling phenomenon at the policy implementation stage shows similar indications, that is when the bureaucracy witnessed deviations, bureaucrats would deliberately stall the regional head's policy implementation. Up to that point, the bureaucracy still has a significant role in policy implementation. The formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policy are an important united combination in public policy.

**Case 2.
Officials of the Reformation Era (Post Civil Service Law)
Stalling Policy Implementation**

There was an instruction given to execute a development project for one of the traditional markets in Tegal Municipality. At the time, a budget of 27 billion rupiahs was made available, in the first stage as much as 9 billion rupiahs was to be disbursed. If the 9 billion disbursement had been successful, the 27 billion would also be disbursed. However, according to the Head of the Regional Office – who had been discharged – such a huge project is an irresponsible one. The market that was to be developed was a new market that had been renovated on several years prior. The policy to develop this market had no strong and logical reasoning. This led to the assumption that the market development project was merely a "fake project" and the political official ultimately intended to reap a one-sided profit from the project.

The Regional Office Head and his/her subordinates (Echelon III and IV) had intentionally stalled the project so that the 9 billion would not be disbursed leaving the project without any implementation. This scenario was made by the bureaucrats who were convinced that it would be dishonorable if the project were to be realized, so they thought that it would be better if the project were discontinued and they succeeded in doing this. The Regional Office Head had received a warning from the Regional Head for being insubordinate.

Source: Results of FGD, and interviews with Informant B1 and Informant B2

The dichotomy of political administration expecting bureaucratic officials to not allocate values on policies is actually inaccurate. This study shows that the role of bureaucratic officials is significant in public policy. When bureaucratic officials' allocation of value is not contained in policy formulation, they could play their cards in the domain of policy implementation. The relationship between bureaucratic and political officials in public policy is a necessity that should be properly maintained by both sides. In the coming period, accountable evidences and pro public values will serve as references in designing policies. Evidence-based public policy will, thus, be of utmost importance to further develop. Scientifically tested evidences can be developed by both sides to assist in designing democratic and rational public policies.

Conclusion

The bureaucracy, which has long been known as the "obedient creature" in policy implementation, has been able to demonstrate in the Reformation Era that they have the capacity to maintain idealistic values of bureaucratic ethics and defend public budget. The bureaucracy with their knowledge and experiences have the instinct to survive, and one of their means of survival from the pressures of political officials' policies is by being opportunistic (two-faced). They undertake efforts of intentionally postponing, or in their own words stalling policy implementation. Policies are accepted as instructions, yet they intentionally buy some time to thwart the implementation of certain policies. Their boldness for stalling policy implementation has actually begun since the onset of the Reformation. In the Tegal Municipality cases, bureaucrats embarked on this endeavor merely because they were convinced that the Mayors/political officials had come up with flawed policies, which are policies that revolve around the political officials' personal financial interests and do not align with public values.

This research demonstrates that the dichotomy of bureaucratic and political officials at the local level in the Reformation Era is different from the definition of politic-administration dichotomy introduced in the early stages of Public Administration studies. In the classical politic-administration dichotomy, the bureaucracy is not allowed space to allocate their values (neutrality principle) rendering them to be accountable only to the political official. In the relationship between bureaucratic and political officials during the Reformation Era which promotes impartiality and merit system, political officials experience dichotomy with the bureaucracy, yet the bureaucracy is still given space to allocate their values in policies. Bureaucrats believing that there are values opposing public interests in the implementation domain will go against political officials by thwarting policy implementation. In the Tegal case, conflict of value had caused failure in implementation, but this proves that the bureaucracy had succeeded in defending public values in its true form.

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