Policy Convergence under Decentralization: Lessons from Indonesia’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract
Research on policy convergence has developed very significantly in comparative literature. However, little is known about the dynamics of policy convergence under unitary systems, assuming that they have greater convergence than under federal systems. This research maintains that unitary systems present no less intricate dynamics of policy convergence than the federal systems. Looking at a decentralized unitary system, this research argues that the dynamics of policy divergence is primarily driven by a need to pursue responsiveness to local priorities. It assesses the case of Indonesia in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic through qualitative and quantitative exploration, combining documentary and the named entity recognition (NER) methods. The main data were sourced from the selected national newspapers sanctioned by the Indonesian Press Board. The result points to several factors affecting policy convergence, namely, responsiveness, compliance, policy inconsistency, policy clarity, leadership, horizontal learning, and electoral politics. Of these factors, the most important one is policy responsiveness; that is, whether national and subnational policies converge or diverge is affected by the need of a subnational government to respond to local priorities. This research fills the void in the current research by understanding the interplay between domestic factors and policy convergence, thereby extending the debate on the dynamic of policy convergence under a decentralized unitary system. Working with the COVID-19 pandemic adds nuances to the literature on crisis-driven policy convergence dynamics. It also points to a practical implication on the importance of crafting better institutional arrangements on national-subnational relations to better respond to pressing issues in a more convergent manner.

Keywords:
policy convergence; divergence; decentralization; responsiveness; COVID-19; Indonesia
Introduction

This research concerns policy convergence under a decentralized unitary system. This article regards policy convergence as an ‘increasing similarity over time in the policies adopted by two or more governments or administrative systems’ (Nutley et al. 2012, 194). The opposite condition implies policy divergence.

Although there has been significant development in the literature on policy convergence, it remains difficult to make generalizations given the heterogeneous approaches adopted. In particular, Holzinger and Knill (2005, 775) maintain that there remains ‘a limited understanding of the causes and conditions of policy convergence’.

To fill the void, this research specifically focuses on the national-subnational convergence (Hannah and Mallinson 2018; Carter et al. 2017; Thompson and Gusmano 2014; Nicholson-Crotty 2009). This literature is still underplayed compared to the global-national policy convergence (Blanco et al. 2020; Zhou et al. 2019; Cole et al. 2015; Aizenman and Ito 2012; Holzinger and Knill 2008; Busch and Jörgens 2005; Heichel et al. 2005; Seeliger 1996; Bennet 1991). This limitation indicates inadequate inquiry of the theory that unitary systems provide an institutional structure that fosters greater national-subnational convergence than federal systems (Thompson and Gusmano 2014). It maintains that federalism gives state governments substantial constitutional and jurisdictional mandates regarding certain policies, while in unitary systems, only the national government possesses such authority (Austin et al. 2018; Biela et al. 2014).

Contrasting with this conventional belief, the present research argues that both unitary and federal systems perform similarly concerning policy convergence. There have been cases of policy divergence under unitary systems, and there have been instances of policy convergence under federal systems (Austin et al. 2018; Kropp and Behnke 2016; Keating et al. 2012). Additionally, federal and unitary systems show similarities regarding institutional complexities and inherent problems in policy-making processes (Sepos 2003, 57). Further, the goal of decentralization has recently shifted from avoiding homogenization to achieving it (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010).

Departing from this background, this research expects to answer the following question: What drives policy convergence or divergence under a decentralized unitary system? It argues that policy convergence is significantly affected by domestic political factors. Under a decentralized unitary system, policy divergence is primarily driven by a motivation to pursue policy responsiveness to local priorities. Policy responsiveness is understood as “the capacity of a political system to respond to the preferences or aspiration of its citizens” (Manza & Cook 2002:630).

This research assesses the case of Indonesia, which has implemented a ‘big bang’ decentralization since 1999, and has made increasing efforts to achieve policy convergence since then. It particularly focuses on Indonesia’s response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Reflecting on the case, this research presents several contributions. It adds to the discussion on the interplay between domestic factors and policy convergence. It also extends the debate on the dynamic of policy convergence under a decentralized unitary system, which is still underplayed. Working with the COVID-19 pandemic, it adds nuances to the literature on crisis-driven policy convergence. While some argue that countries developed similar domestic response to the pandemic (Sayers et al 2023), this research finds a strong variation across regions and time in Indonesia. Explaining this variation provides insight into the literature on domestic policy convergence.

The next section elaborates on the existing literature concerning policy convergence,
focussing on associated explanatory variables. This is followed by a brief discussion of the research method. The subsequent section presents finding and discussion on policy convergence. The paper concludes with conclusions and implications.

**Decentralization and Policy Convergence**

Decentralization as the ‘transfer of power and resources away from the central government’ (Schneider 2003:33) has presented a new challenge for policy convergence. Policy convergence is understood as any ‘increase in similarity over time in the policies adopted by two or more governments or administrative systems’ (Nutley et al. 2012, 194). This definition is similar to the one proposed by Knill (2005, 768), which conceives policy convergence as ‘an increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy […] across a given set of political jurisdictions […] over a given period of time’. The ‘similarity’ mentioned in these definitions relates to five areas: policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes, and policy style (Bennett 1991, 218). Understanding these definitions requires close consideration of the temporal dimension of policy change (Cole et al. 2015, 298).

This research focusses on two specific aspects of policy convergence. The first is national-subnational policy convergence. This issue has attracted attention in federalism literature, sometimes under the more general framework of intergovernmental relations or national-regional tension. However, policy convergence under unitary systems has received relatively little attention, as unitary systems are assumed to automatically secure policy convergence. Contrasting this supposition, Keating (2010, 454) reminds us that devolution may foster divergence in policy instruments, policy objectives, or even the policy paradigm itself.

The second focus of this research is convergence of policy content. This focus is based on the fact that, despite the common belief that subnational governments comply with national policy content due to tight national supervision and incentives, there have been many incidences of content divergence between levels of government under unitary systems.

While the influence of international factors is highly acknowledged, recent developments have underlined the importance of domestic factors, particularly institutional arrangements (Dobbins et al. 2018). One of the most frequently cited domestic institutional arrangements is partisan configuration. It has been argued that policy convergence prevails when there is national and regional party congruence. Such congruence ensures partisan links concerning ideas and loyalties, which foster policy convergence (Mathieu et al. 2020; Dobbins et al. 2018; Keating 201). In contrast, in certain circumstances, subnational parties may pursue distinct interests to achieve responsiveness; these interests can vary across regions and differ from the national partisan position (Stecker 2015). This tendency can be neutralized by strong party control, but it cannot be completely eliminated; according to Debus (2008, 510), there is a high probability that regional governments will veto federal bills ‘if different regional political interests exist, or if subnational partisan government coalitions do not reflect the federal government coalition’.

The importance of regional partisan preference may be affected by the nature of national-local relationships, which influence the political pressure on governments to take distinct actions (Nutley et al. 2012). When decentralization is used as a tool to ease central-local tensions, the probability of competition or conflict nevertheless sustains. This manifests in policy-making processes, in which regional governments may make decisions that diverge from those of the national government. Further, the presence of a strong regional party with past secessionist orientation, or at least opposing...
ideological preferences, makes convergence even more difficult (Hannah and Mallinson, 2018). The existence of a strong epistemic community at different levels of government, or pressure for interdependency and policy learning, may restore convergence, but this is not guaranteed (Mathieu et al. 2020; Keating 2010).

Regional strategic interests may also help explain policy convergence. The so-called ‘electoral pressure’, or ‘political responsiveness’, thesis argues that regional and local governments are likely to adopt innovations that extend benefits to strong, popular, and powerful target populations, or to impose burdens on weak and politically marginalized groups. This ‘defiant innovation’ is explained by pressures for responsiveness, especially in anticipation of regional or local elections (Hannah and Mallinson 2018; Boushey 2016).

Degree of autonomy may also affect policy convergence under decentralization (van Rompuy 2020; Swanson and Barrilleaux 2020). The higher a regional government’s degree of autonomy, the lower the possibility of policy convergence. More autonomous regions tend to maintain distance from national governments and prioritize local preferences. Depending on the characteristics of the decentralization arrangement, autonomous regions may develop distinct policies, or they may merely develop homegrown instruments with which to implement the national policy. To reduce the risk of policy divergence, national governments frequently develop systematic and comprehensive policies that feature clear goals, content, and instruments, giving subnational governments little scope for independent decision-making. National governments may also apply strong supervisory mechanisms to ensure convergence; these can be complemented by clear, credible signals regarding inducements and constraints (Hannah and Mallinson 2018; Liu and Li 2016; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Allen et al. 2004). Along with these measures, national governments need to provide reliable leadership and policy, the absence of which may lead to defiant policy innovation. Such deviation may afford divergent policy innovation or the development of adversarial and conflicting relations (Ferraiolo 2008, 492).

The demand for a decisive national government is higher in countries in which the principle of nullification on the part of subnational governments is constitutionally secured. This principle maintains the right of subnational governments to reverse, or refuse to implement, national policies perceived to be unconstitutional; in other words, to implement interposition, claiming they are protecting citizens from unconstitutional national acts (Thompson and Gusmano 2014, 404). While common in federal countries, the same principle is also applicable in some unitary countries.

Krane (2007) identified at least four motivations that lead subnational governments to pursue independent policy preferences: 1) to fill a policy void left by federal inaction; 2) to correct/modify perceived defects in national policy; 3) to communicate/signal subnational issues or problems to the national government; and 4) to follow/oppose policies adopted by other subnational governments. Such reticence on the part of subnational governments results in policy inaction, which has cumulative effects on the national agenda (Carter et al. 2017). Thus, national governments are pressured to create comprehensive policies while also being responsive to local priorities.

Closer examination of policy goals, policy instruments, and policy tools reveals that the degree of convergence varies. Radaelli (2005) argues that convergence in policy instruments and tools is more likely than convergence in policy goals; however, policy goals have greater transmissibility. There is a tendency among devolved countries not to pursue different policy objectives, but to develop different methods of achieving the same goals (Nutley et al. 2012).
To ensure far-reaching convergence, national governments must present explicit policy goals, instruments, and tools, and they must expect full compliance from subnational governments. However, when the policy-making process is marked by confrontation and bargaining instead of problem-solving, a joint decision trap or policy status quo may materialize (Sepos 2003).

Acknowledging the effect of multiple factors on policy convergence, this research maintains that policy responsiveness is the primary influencing factor. In a decentralized system, policy responsiveness may operate in conjunction with decentralization and regional autonomy. That is, when facing various priorities and time constraints, subnational governments may oppose national directions in favour of policy and political responsiveness to its constituents.

**Method**

This research features a case study of Indonesia, combining qualitative and quantitative methods. This case study was used to obtain a more nuanced understanding of policy convergence as a complex intergovernmental phenomenon (Thompson and Gusmano 2014). This case study enables the author to take contextual factors into account, particularly the range of different, occasionally contrasting perspectives among the actors involved, when examining policy convergence (Nutley et al. 2012, 206). A qualitative case study also provides a more detailed account on how policy convergence or divergence works in reality. The narratives provide context-specific and process-oriented accounts that help readers to understand the intricate dynamics of policy convergence. A quantitative method was applied using the ‘named entity recognition’ (NER) method. NER helps identifying factors of policy convergence or divergence, which are then elaborated qualitatively.

Indonesia was chosen because it has been implementing big-bang decentralization since 1999. Since then, the national-subnational policy convergence has shown substantial dynamism. The national government has sometimes taken repressive mechanisms to ensure convergence by cancelling problematic local regulations. Up to 2017, the national government has revoked 6,928 local regulations, or around 495 regulations per year (Agustino 2017). It is combined with fiscal contractual instruments to ensure convergence. While the phenomenon is not so typical, the case of Indonesia can have broad implications for comparative literature.

This research particularly investigates Indonesia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under crisis circumstances, it is important to investigate the extent to which both national and subnational governments implement an effective and convergent response, putting the viability of different governance types to test (Zuo et al. 2017; Mintz & Wayne 2016). In the Indonesian context, the COVID-19 pandemic is interesting given the strong variation in national and subnational policy responses. The initial period of the pandemic (March to early April 2020) was marked by predominantly divergent responses, while the subsequent period (mid-April 2020 onward) was characterized by relatively convergent responses. Indonesia was among the countries most seriously affected by the pandemic, recording a fatality rate of 3.7% and exceeding the world average of 2.9%. Notably, the fatality rate peaked at 7% in March 2020, making the initial period a very interesting case (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/indonesia).

This research collected data through documentary studies of government policies, media coverage, and previous research. These data were used to triangulate and complement each other to ensure reliability. Government policies are those issued by both national and some subnational governments across various areas since March 2020, in dealing with the pandemic. They were used as the point of
departure of analysis. The author also consulted previous research to determine the factors underlying policy divergence.

Upon analysing government documents, NER was applied. It is a method of machine learning that ‘finds, extracts, and automatically classifies named entities from open domains and unstructured texts’ (Budi and Suryono 2023:969) to understand a certain issue. It helps identify and classify media texts into predefined categories – in this case, policy convergence or divergence – and reasons for this classification. It specifically identified and analysed media coverage of national and subnational government policies for addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. Seventy-five media resources were chosen from across Indonesia based on two criteria: they are sanctioned by Indonesia Press Board, and they present complete information by using a combination of several keywords such as COVID-19, pandemic, local government, national government, and conflict. News from these resources was collected using the screen-scrapping method. Using several combined keywords, 40,522 media articles were obtained. These were pre-processed through cleansing and filtering, in which the titles and content were rechecked to ensure relevance. Consequently, 12,967 articles were returned. These articles were pre-analysed using a combination of top words, quotation detection, and topic-modelling techniques. After another round of filtering and quotation labelling, 6,001 quotes from 5,069 articles were found. Further filtering was then performed to select only news with quotations that clearly stated motivations for supporting (convergence) or opposing (divergence) national policy. This returned 421 articles.

This research then analyzed the articles using a thematic approach. First, each article was categorized into whether it converged into or diverged from national policy. The analysis adopted Bennett’s (1991:218) categorization of policy convergence, focusing on policy content and instruments. Then, the analysis continued with categorizing the motives behind divergence or convergence using a combination of descriptive statistics and some anecdotal narratives. The categorization was built upon conceptual and theoretical interpretation, which was consulted with much broader literature. Among the motives are (1) policy responsiveness – the capacity of a political system to respond to the preferences or aspiration of its citizens; (2) compliance – the extent to which the subnational policies follows precisely the national directions; (3) policy consistency – whether or not the national government can credibly maintain its policies in a certain period; (4) policy clarity – the extent to which policy content and instrument are understood clearly by stakeholders; (5) leadership – whether the national government can act swiftly in a well-coordinated manner; (6) horizontal learning – the lesson learned from other entities or countries in dealing with the same problem; and (7) electoral politics – the pressure or incentive to boost political benefit.

Results and Discussion
Policy Convergence in Decentralized Indonesia
General Overview

The implementation of big-bang decentralization in Indonesia has brought many significant changes to the country. At the same time, it has also posed some daunting challenges, one of which is to ensure policy convergence at different levels of government. Indonesia employs two main mechanisms in this regard. The first involves engineering a clear distribution of functional competencies across national and subnational – province, regency, and city – governments. The national government possesses five exclusive competencies: foreign affairs, defence and security, fiscal and monetary affairs, judiciary affairs, and religious affairs. All other competencies are distributed based on the principles of efficiency, externality, and accountability. Law 23/2014
on Local Government states that the national government possesses legislative authority, and that subnational governments can only develop regulatory frameworks – local bylaws or hereby Perda – to implement national laws. This clarifies that the national government sets overall policy goals, leaving some discretion for subnational governments regarding their implementation (Republic of Indonesia 2014; Safa’at 2015). This is strengthened by a clear stipulation on the hierarchy of laws and regulations where local regulations have to comply with national laws and regulations.

The second mechanism for ensuring the national-subnational policy convergence concerns judicial review, through which the national government may revoke Perdas it deems non-compliant with the national framework. To avoid intergovernmental tensions, the national government employs an executive review mechanism when the final drafts of Perdas must be reviewed by the provincial government in question before they are passed. Similarly, the final drafts of provincial Perda must be submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs for review and must receive the Ministry’s approval. If the Ministry finds an infringement, it can revoke a Perda (Safa’at 2015). At the same time, the subnational governments challenge national laws through the Constitutional Court.

These two mechanisms should be sufficient to foster national-subnational policy convergence. However, since 2002, the national government has revoked 6,928 Perdas, averaging 495 Perdas per year (Agustino 2017). Most of the Perdas deal with taxes and levies that compromised the national framework for creating a friendlier investment climate. President Jokowi maintained that these Perdas contradicted the national government’s moves to boost investment1 (see also Warburton 2016; Yusuf and Sumner 2015). However, subnational governments have an interest in increasing local revenues, as most excessively depend on national transfer (Siddiquee et al. 2012; Butt 2010; Zuhro et al. 2010). The rest of the revoked Perdas are religion-based or ‘shari’a Perda,’ which sometimes may compromise the foundation of Indonesia’s multicultural society. Subnational governments have argued that they need these regulations to address local problems, such as gambling, prostitution, and alcohol consumption, for which national frameworks have been ineffective. Critics maintain that these moves are designed to increase electoral support rather than promote people’s morals (Buehler and Muhtada 2014; Buehler 2008).

As of now, Indonesia is still facing problems in improving national-subnational policy convergence. The passage of the sweeping Law on Job Creation and the regulation on the regional minimum wage in October 2020 are instructive anecdotes of the problem. Different preferences between the national and subnational governments have created policy uncertainty and tension. This must be improved by understanding the motivations of stakeholders.

The COVID-19 Pandemic Response

While COVID-19 has spread globally, the pace of transmission and the number of casualties has varied across countries. Indonesia is among the most populous countries experiencing a systemic impact of the pandemic. The analysis in this section divides the pandemic into two periods: March to early April 2020, which was marked by policy divergence, and mid-April 2020 onwards, which was marked by relative policy convergence between the national and subnational governments.

Early Response: Policy Divergence

It took the national government almost one month from the date of the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Indonesia to take responsive measures to the pandemic. First, it established a Task Force, and on March 31, 2020, the
The president issued three concomitant policies: the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law or PERPU No. 1/2020, Government Regulation No. 21/2020 on large-scale social distancing, and Presidential Decree No. 11/2020 declaring Covid-19 a health emergency. The social distancing policy basically limited the mobility of people while allowing only certain activities to take place with tight protocols. President Jokowi’s administration argued that their policy was the best means of balancing the health, economic, and social concerns associated with the pandemic. Overall, citizens perceived the government response as very slow (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting [SMRC] 2020).

The delay of and dissatisfaction with the national government policy led several subnational governments to adopt diverging policies with varying titles. For example, the City of Surabaya adopted a temporary lockdown and a regional quarantine; the Province of Papua applied extended social restriction; the City of Bekasi implemented humanitarian isolation; the City of Solo issued a semi lockdown; the City of Tegal implemented a full local lockdown; and the City of Tasikmalaya applied a local lockdown; the City of Tegal implemented a full local lockdown; the City of Banda Aceh did a partial lockdown; the Regency of Toli-Toli implemented a territorial quarantine; the City of Medan applied a cluster lockdown; and still many other different regions had different terms for their responses (Lele 2023:317). The choice of the term also was highly questionable, as was the legal base for it.

Of these diverging responses, the case of Jakarta deserves special attention. As the pandemic became more serious, Governor Anies Baswedan urged the national government to be more transparent regarding its response to the pandemic. Given the level of spread, Anies asked the national government to implement a regional quarantine. His proposal was rejected by the president on the grounds that such a decision was the responsibility of the Ministry of Health; the president recommended applying only local isolation at the neighbourhood level. In response to this rejection, the governor adopted more moderate measures, halting the operation of intercity and inter-provincial public transportation (bus and train) and closing several tourist destinations. However, this initiative was revoked by the Ministry of Transportation. Instead, the Ministry recommended the implementation of more disciplined social distancing among travellers, stating that the governor’s policy could only be adopted after a thorough assessment of the economic impact. As a result of his erratic decisions, the public assessed the governor’s performance negatively (SMRC 2020).

A different approach was implemented in the province of Central Java. Governor Ganjar Pranowo adopted all measures that were convergent with national policy. He collaborated with local regents and mayors, seeking to prevent and respond to the pandemic by prioritizing strong coordination, socialization, and public education. This was part of a locally developed strategy, as requested by the national government. As a result of this strategy, Central Java has, despite its huge geographical span and population, controlled the spread of the virus. Ganjar has also been perceived by the public as the most successful subnational leader regarding addressing the virus (SMRC 2020).

This section shows that the national and subnational governments shared the same policy goals regarding addressing the pandemic, but divergence appeared regarding policy content and policy instruments. In the two cases outlined, while Central Java adopted a policy instrument that was consistently convergent with the national government’s strategy, this was not the case for Jakarta.

Through media analysis with the NER technique, several determinants that motivate subnational governments to take diverging measures were identified. Of the 430 related news items, 156 news items related to policy divergence
during the first months of the pandemic. As shown in Figure 1, there were at least seven factors for policy divergence.

Of these seven reasons, policy responsiveness was clearly the major determinant of policy divergence. As mentioned previously, it took delay in the first month of the pandemic. The reason for this delay was difficulty finding a balance among health, social, and economic concerns. The national government realized that, while COVID-19 was primarily a health issue, it had broad social and economic implications. Thus, the national government needed to calculate the economic and social implications of each option. Because of the delay, many subnational governments had adopted measures that contrasted with the national direction. The main reason for this divergence was the pressing demands on the subnational governments to protect their populations. For some subnational governments, COVID-19 represented purely a serious health issue, and any delay in response could cost many lives. They argued that protecting the people was of primary importance, and that local governments were better able to do this than the national government. This was explicitly expressed by the governor of Jakarta, the governor of Papua, the mayor of Surakarta, the mayor of Tegal, and the mayor of Bekasi. The governor of Papua was quoted to say that he has to limit people’s mobility to Papua due to the ever increasing concern over the spread of the virus that may affect local people (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/25/07591621/mendagri-tak-setuju-pemprov-papua-tutup-wilayah-akibat-covid-19).

The second-most important motive for national-subnational divergence was policy inconsistency. Not only did the national government fail to adopt bold measures, but it also frequently changed its policy. For example, the national government initially tried to limit people’s mobility, but then it loosened the air transportation conditions (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/05/08/12555981/ketua-mpr-kebijakan-pemerintah-operasikan-kembali-transportasi-umum). This created confusion for some subnational governments and caused them to adopt divergent measures. In a joint session between the Ministry of Transportation and the parliament, an MP was quoted to say that the government had issued some overlapping and inconstant policies that confused the people and subnational governments (https://

### Figure 1.
Factors affecting policy divergence (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>61.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>19.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Politics</td>
<td>17.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Learning</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s analysis.*
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Policy unclarity was the next major reason for policy divergence. The national government occasionally announced very general guidelines, which provided a poor framework for subnational implementation. For example, when limitations on air travel were announced, it was not clear which airports were allowed to remain open. The conduct of tracing and testing measures also lacked clarity, leading regions and health facilities to adopt divergent measures. An informed expert maintained that “there is no clear direction and guidelines for the public; what is the real policy, who is in charge of supervising it...if the government is concerned with the economic aspect, what is the concrete measure to anticipate that” (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/02/06121251/pemerintah-dinilai-tak-punya-kebijakan-yang-jelas-soal-penanganan-virus).

Moreover, subnational governments witnessed the success of countries such as China, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, which contained the virus through different but bold measures, and expected the national government to learn and adopt similar practices. When the national government failed to do so, subnational governments adopted unilateral, nonconvergent measures. The leader of Indonesian Congress (MPR) maintained that “Wuhan still prohibits foreigners to visit. Why should we welcome foreigners? Why should we do the same?” (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5005633/atasi-covid-19-pimpinan-mpr-dorong-pemerintah-buat-kebijakan-tegas).

Toward More Convergence

The dynamics of the policy divergence in the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic changed significantly after President Jokowi adopted a much bolder policy in late March. On March 31, 2020, he declared three important policies: Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (PERPU 1/2020), Government Regulation on Large-Scale Social Restriction (PP 21/2020), and a presidential decree proclaiming COVID-19 to be a community health emergency (Perpres 11/2020). These were long-awaited policies that served as foundations for government institutions at different levels to respond to the pandemic. On April 13, he issued another presidential decree, Perpres 12/2020, declaring COVID-19 a national disaster.
These policies received varying reactions from subnational governments, but the general trend was towards stronger policy convergence. There were no opposite policy directions of the subnational governments. The present research uncovered several factors underlying this change, as shown in the following figure 2.

The first and strongest factor was compliance. The national government implemented incentive and disincentive mechanisms to ensure subnational compliance. These included tight control of fiscal transfer by the national government. President Jokowi mandated that subnational governments reallocate and refocus expenditure to respond to the pandemic, focusing on health necessities, economic growth, and a social safety net for the most affected groups. Subnational governments were given a deadline by which to revise their budgets and submit the revisions to the Ministry of Finance. On April 29th, 2020, the Ministry of Finance publicly named the subnational governments that failed to comply, and the national transfer to these governments was cut and then postponed. This mechanism succeeded in ensuring compliance from subnational governments, although they continued to raise some concerns and opposing views. Nevertheless, some governors, mayors, and regents openly acknowledged that the national government had policy-making authority for the pandemic, and that they must comply with the national government’s decisions. Governor of North Kalimantan maintained that “this regulation must be implemented by all local agencies. At the same, we need to optimize socialization to contain the worst possible effect of the pandemic” (https://kaltara.antaranews.com/berita/466046/gubernur-minta-kebijakan-penangan-covid-19-ditindaklanjuti). Similarly, the governor of West Java stated, “I implement a proactive policy, but it is in line with the national policies. There are some minor technical differences since I know better the condition. I still refer to the national direction, instruction and decision” (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4966614/jabar-tegaskan-kebijakan-penangan-an-covid-19-sejalan-dengan-pusat).

The next contributing factor was responsiveness. The implementation of a bolder and clearer policy by the national government accorded with the subnational governments’ interest in serving their constituents. The second wave of response enabled the subnational governments...
government to be more responsive to the pandemic, such as in the case of the budget reallocation and refocussing policy. The regent of Jember, for example, stated, “If the budget is insufficient, we will refocus the allocation to serve the people. The most important one is to make the people of Jember well-off...we also provide tax incentive to stimulate the economy” (https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1423429/pemkab-jember-anggarkan-penanganan-covid-19-rp4794-miliar). Similarly, the governor of Jakarta said, “In line with the social distancing policy, our government is the first to provide social safety net to help poor people” (https://www.viva.co.id/berita/metro/1275302-anies-klaim-dki-jakarta-pertama-bagikan-bansos). This illustrates how national policies have facilitated the subnational governments to be more responsive to local concerns, leading to convergence.

Electoral politics was the third factor that contributed to policy convergence. The COVID-19 Pandemic occurred concurrent to the 2020 subnational election. All candidates, including incumbent governors, mayors, and regents, tried to appeal to voters by publicizing their proposed approach to COVID-19. With the many new initiatives launched by the president, it was politically risky for the candidates to oppose the national agenda. All promised to develop a local policy agenda that accorded with national directions. The candidates for the regent of Bima, for example, made a declaration to “follow the Covid-19 protocol” (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5192461/paslon-pilbup-bima-teken-komitmen-patuhi-protokol-covid-19-saat-kampanye). This was also found in Mojokerto (https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-5167678/tiga-paslon-janji-patuhi-protokol-kesehatan-di-pilbup-mojokerto). Some political figures who previously refused to undertake the rapid test finally initiated it and participated in other Covid-related activities.

“These initiatives are urgent since government has taken a much tougher measure to limit people’s mobility through the large-scale social distancing policy” (https://www.jpnn.com/news/anggota-fraksi-mps-dpr-kembali-potong-gaji-untuk-bantu-rakyat-terdampak-corona).

The last yet minor factor explaining policy convergence is horizontal learning. Subnational governments could assess the effectiveness of the national policy by comparing it with, and learning from, the experiences of other countries. Some countries that tried to implement national lockdowns presented varying degrees of success. Thus, the adoption of large-scale social distancing, where physical mobility was only moderately restricted and economic activities were allowed under several conditions, was considered the best option for Indonesia. This led to policy convergence between national and subnational governments. One of the MPR leaders was quoted to say, “We need a bold, well-coordinated, and consistent policy. China has implemented a tight policy by prohibiting entries...South Korea and Czech also only ease the mobility after it managed to reduce infection and mortality rates” (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5005633/atasi-covid-19-pimpinan-mpr-dorong-pemerintah-buat-kebijakan-tegas). This implied the need for a more convergent policy.

This research expects to assess the factors affecting the national-subnational policy convergence (or divergence). Of the seven factors, this research shows that policy responsiveness has the relatively consistent effect for both policy convergence and divergence. Under a decentralized system, subnational governments have assumed more power and responsibility to address local priorities. When the national government delays policy decisions under pressing time, provides poor guidance, or contradicts local priorities, subnational governments are politically pressured to make controversial decisions. Even when the national government makes a policy,
there is always room for subnational governments to connect that policy to local priorities. This is evident in the way Indonesia responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. This links to the much broader debate on democratic quality and responsiveness (Boushey 2016; Thomas 2010). When the national leadership fails to act swiftly, subnational governments frequently intervene, and they may do so with vigour (Haffajee and Melo 2020). Similarly, the subnational government may act to fill the void left by the national inaction, to correct the perceived defect of the national policy, or to raise pressing issues to the national government (Krane 2007).

The finding also links to one of the classical debates in democratic governance literature concerning the potential clash between responsive and responsible government (Karremans and Lefkofridi 2020). With the implementation of decentralization, subnational governments are under constant pressure to be more responsive. This short-term calculation frequently raises tensions with a responsible government, which brings the national government in. Dealing with crises such as the pandemic requires a good balance between them. Moreover, democratic politics necessitates a balance between the temporal characteristics of responsive and responsible policies (Goetz 2015). As discussed previously, the national government tried to strike a balance between health, economic, and social dimensions of the pandemic while the subnational government focused only on responding to the health aspect amidst concerns for more casualties.

Policy consistency and clarity may also affect policy convergence; these become even more important in crisis circumstances. Liu and Li (2016) maintain that when national policy goals and policy content seem clear, subnational governments adjust their divergent policy instruments to convergent ones that conform with the national policy content. This accords with the literature on credible signals (Hannah and Mallinson 2018; see also Allen et al. 2004) and positive national coercion (Nicholson-Crotty 2009). The case of Indonesia shows that the absence of credible policy has led the subnational government to different directions in the initial period of the pandemic. The credibility can be improved by making a clear policy and maintaining it in a resolute way. This is sometimes compromised when decisive action is needed to respond to a new development, connecting to a classical debate between policy resoluteness and decisiveness (MacIntyre 2003).

The level of policy convergence improves if the national policy contains effective oversight or even coercion (Nutley et al. 2012). The national authority may even seek to secure compliance by tying its policy to certain incentives (Gordon et al. 2020). This can be seen in the second period of Indonesia's COVID-19 response, during which the national government declared a much clearer policy and instruments, which were then strengthened by supervision and sanctions for non-compliant behaviour. Stronger national enforcement or positive national coercion reduces the potential for subnational defiant innovation (Hannah and Mallinson 2018:408). In contrast, an absence of clear policies and instruments leads to a sense of a national leadership crisis or dissatisfaction, which allows the coexistence of diverging policies or motivates adversarial relations (Ferraiola 2008).

While not as dominant as the above-mentioned factors, horizontal learning is also important. The factor has become the most referred in comparative literature (Mathieu et al. 2020). This is seen in both the first and second period of the pandemic where some officers and experts referred to other countries’ experiences to voice their concern and responses to national policy. The pressure to emulate others increases as more countries become connected. Other countries’ best experience may set an example that justifies subnational governments’ choices to either support or oppose national
initiatives. This trend is connected to policy-learning or demonstration-effect literature, which explains policy diffusion or adoption (Mathieu et al. 2020; Hannah and Mallinson 2018; Dupuy 2014; Keating et al. 2012; Holzinger and Knill 2005). However, the effects of external factors must be considered cautiously, as they may be moderated by pre-existing domestic arrangements (Dobbins et al. 2018).

To a much lesser extent and scope, this research also examined the effect of electoral politics. When there is a fragmented partisan block and/or an approaching election, each party may make controversial moves to win votes (Mathieu et al. 2020; Dobbins et al. 2018; Stecker 2015; Keating 2010). This may result in diverging policy agendas, even when unified action is required. In countries that are politically fragmented, such as Indonesia, policy convergence becomes neglected during crises. To restore it, stronger party congruence and partisan links are required (Dobbins et al. 2018). Under certain electoral arrangements, the degree of convergence or divergence is a matter of political calculation (Keating 2010). This is especially clear in the case of DKI Jakarta when Governor Anis seemed to play an electoral game in dealing with national policies. The opposite is true for the case of Central Java where the governor shared the same partisan block with the president.

This discussion implies that, since policy convergence depends on several factors, there needs to be more systematic research. This is not to mention the multidimensionality of policy convergence in terms of scope and aspect. Policy convergence under a decentralized unitary system begs further research, and this may be approached from different angles and methods.

**Conclusion**

This research explored policy convergence in Indonesia using anecdotal evidence and a case study. Focussing on the degree of policy convergence between the national and subnational governments, it found that Indonesia has struggled to ensure policy convergence in many areas; this struggle has created tensions between the national and subnational governments. This research illustrated this by investigating the government response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which was marked initially by policy divergence, and later by policy convergence. This research also explored the factors that influence the dynamics of national-subnational policy convergence. Policy responsiveness posed a relatively consistent influence on both policy convergence and divergence; a finding that accords well with existing literature (Boushey 2016; Arnold and Franklin 2012; Thomas 2010). The other factor identified was credible policy, that is, subnational governments make decisions to converge or diverge based on assessments of the credibility of the national policy. When national policy has a clear objective and instruments, policy convergence develops. This is especially the case when such policies are supported by strong supervision and sanctions. However, unclear objectives and instruments foster policy divergence, as shown in the first period of Indonesia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Compliance was also found to be important to explain policy convergence but not policy divergence.

This research also found several other factors with different degrees of influence, such as electoral politics, national leadership, and policy learning or the ‘neighbourhood effect’. Further investigation of these factors will greatly enrich the literature.

Based on the findings, it can be concluded that national-subnational convergence varies over time. Of many factors, it is evident that policy responsiveness is the main factor responsible for both policy convergence and divergence. This accords with the spirit of decentralization, which is intended to increase the government’s ability to identify and address problems. Since 1999, Indonesia has decided to transfer most
of its government competencies to subnational levels. The unanticipated disadvantage of this policy is that it has created a distinctive dynamic of intergovernmental relations that affect policy convergence. To some extent, this has encouraged a patchwork response to the pandemic (Haffajee and Melo 2020). Therefore, there has to be a much clearer arrangement on the distribution of competencies for all levels of government, without losing the spirit of collaboration provided by unitary systems. This is especially important during crises such as pandemics since some levels of government may exceed their jurisdiction to assist others (Gordon et al. 2020). Similarly, a stronger coordination is needed to improve the quality of policy making. These are few implications Indonesia may lend to other countries.

This research has a limitation. While the case-study approach used afforded more nuanced understanding, it was applied relatively less systematically. The NER technique helps identify the factors but not the degree of relationships, which requires a quantitative approach. A qualitative case study requires a stronger counter-factual, which can only be partially addressed concerning policy responsiveness and, to a lesser extent, horizontal learning but not the other factors. However, even with its limitation, this study has presented grounds for further research regarding the dynamics of national-subnational policy convergence under decentralization. Future research is required to explore this topic more systematically and comparatively, such as the effectiveness of compliance approach, the role of leadership, and the effect of electoral politics.

References


