

Mujibur Rahman Khairul Muluk

Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Administrative Science, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia.

Sajida

Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Indonesia.
(corresponding author: sajida@staff.uns.ac.id)

Submitted: 23 April 2026, Revised: 29 June 2026, Accepted: 30 June 2026

Mujibur Rahman Khairul Muluk

is a Professor in the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Administrative Science, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. His scholarly work centres on decentralisation, local governance, and systems thinking, with a particular emphasis on institutional dynamics and public sector complexity.

Sajida is a Junior Lecturer in Public Administration at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Indonesia. She holds a Bachelor's degree from Universitas Brawijaya and a Master's degree from Universitas Gadjah Mada, with research interests in public policy, education, digital and AI governance, bibliometric analysis, public-private partnerships, and multi-perspective public administration development.

Copyright: © 2026 Mujibur Rahman Khairul Muluk, Sajida
This work is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. To review a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>

Policy & Governance Review
ISSN 2580-4820
Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 258-274
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v10i3.1395>

What Drives Governance Reversal and How Does it Reshape State–Society Relations in Indonesia

Abstract

This study investigates governance reversal as a failure-driven institutional reconfiguration, through which decentralized, networked, or collaborative arrangements are re-centralized under state authority. This study combines a systematic literature review with a document-based qualitative analysis of three Indonesian policy domains: halal certification reform, the Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) program, and military involvement in food governance through territorial development battalions. This article formalizes a failure-reversal framework by mapping the sequence of failure, political interpretation, and institutional reconfiguration onto four analytical dimensions: institutional change, authority shift, policy justification, and governance mode. The framework also identifies two possible outcome pathways: corrective capacity, where state reassertion improves coordination and implementation, and pathological centralization, where reassertion intensifies executive dominance, symbolic institutionalism, and accountability deficits. The Indonesian cases are treated as purposively selected, maximum-variation illustrative cases rather than as a basis for an unconditional empirical generalization. Therefore, governance reversal is proposed as an analytically transferable but scope-conditioned concept for studying how governance failures reshape state-society relations.

Keywords: governance reversal; state–society relations; Institutional reconfiguration; democratic backsliding; Indonesia

Introduction

In recent years, governance has become a metaphor that has shifted from a hierarchical, state-based approach to a more decentralized, networked, and collaborative approach. Governance arrangements that rely on a hierarchically organized customary form of authority through central government/bureaucratic control of governance have been supplemented and, in increasing measure, replaced by arrangements involving private actors, civil society, and transnational actors at various geographic scales. Such a stance is in line with the conception of “governance without government,”

in which the state is enmeshed, not dominating, a multilevel coordination system (Rhodes, 1996; Peters & Pierre, 2000). These have been set in the context of the growth of neoliberalism and the spread of decentralization and network governance principles that emphasize flexibility, participation, and efficiency.

However, this does not necessarily mean that there is a historical tendency toward decentralization and pluralization. However, the re-emergence of the state is evident in its reactions to crises, failures in systems, and gaps in decentralized governance. In areas ranging from economic policy to public utility management and regulation, state capitalism and a renewed role for the state have become visible as governments assert themselves in key industries to address global uncertainty and governance issues (Bremmer, 2010; Rodrik, 2021). This suggests a non-linear, non-deterministic process where transition of governance can be cyclical or recursive.

At the same time, the literature has become increasingly aware of the intrinsic fragility of governance systems: even market-based, networked and collaborative systems fail. Another approach: the failure of a policy can be ascribed to the relation between political incentives, institutional settings, and administrative capacity. Fragmentation, lack of coordination, and the gap between the design of the policy and the context in which it is implemented are also seen as the main causes of a policy failure (Park, 2021; Bassoli & Campomori, 2024). Gaps in implementation can arise when there is a weak capacity to monitor the policy (Clare & Creed, 2014).

Governance failure is also deeply political because the meaning of failure is constructed, interpreted, and mobilized by political actors. Blame avoidance and scapegoating through narrative framing shape perceptions of state capacity (Pettus, 2020). Governance failures may be reframed to divert attention from state and systemic governance problems (Huda et al., 2025). Thus, institutional failure is not a foregone conclusion but a politically mediated concept that can justify institutional changes.

This raises the question of what occurs after a governance failure. While much literature has diagnosed governance failure and its causes, less

attention has been paid to structural and institutional responses. One prominent response is the reassertion of state authority, wherein governments reclaim regulatory, coordinating, or implementation functions previously devolved to non-state actors. This is especially visible when decentralized or privatized governance models are perceived to have failed. State bureaucracies reclaiming authority from private regulatory modes have been described as governance reversal (Giessen et al., 2016), namely, the process through which authority, control, and decision-making are re-centralized due to the failure or threatened failure of governance arrangements. Governance reversal is not merely a return to customary government forms but a reconfiguration of governance modes, often within hybrid arrangements combining state governance with residual network or market governance. It is not inherently normative: it may solve coordination problems but may also generate over-centralization, bureaucratic inflexibility, and accountability deficits.

Empirical observations help explain when a governance reversal becomes feasible. Excessive fragmentation in decentralized systems may trigger the demand for stronger central interventions. Intergovernmental conflicts and incoherent policies may result from authority fragmentation in multilevel governance (Fermeglia, 2023). Weakly empowered institutions may also fail to ensure compliance in international governance settings, producing gaps between mandates and outcomes (Wenham & Davies, 2023) and creating pressure for more centralized, hierarchical governance. Governance reversal can also coincide with other processes of governance, such as autocratization, populist rule, and democratic backsliding, given that when participation decreases, polarization grows, institutions stagnate, executive aggrandizement, and the weakening of accountability constraints are possible (Campos et al., 2024). In this respect, the concept of governance reversal is unclear because it may be used to enhance state capacity but can also be used to enable illiberal change.

Despite this body of literature, the concept of governance reversal is relatively under-theorized. The current discussion comments are usually attached to other notions or themes like “recentralization,” “state

resurgence,” or even “policy reversal,” but without a coherent analysis. They have not systematically investigated how governance failure leads to institutional reconfiguration, what mechanisms explain this, and what consequences can be derived for governance arrangements. This study aims to meet this need by conceptualizing and empirically studying governance reversal. It builds on the existing body of literature on governance failure, policy failure, democratic backsliding, and institutional change, while borrowing from recent policy developments in the field of public goods provision, regulatory regimes, and the withdrawal of the state to add governance reversal as a new category of analysis. This study builds on a general theoretical framework but chooses Indonesia as an empirical focus. Indonesia is highly relevant because of its tradition of decentralization, the existence of hybrid governance models, and the recent revival of the state in different sectors and policies. Thus, the arguments are not intended as “generally” valid, but as analytically transferable propositions with different settings of their forms and degrees of intensity, depending on the political-institutional context.

For the Indonesian case, this argument must also be situated within the comparative politics literature on post-Suharto decentralization, state restructuring, and the democratic regression. Decentralization after 1998 redistributed authority to local governments and created new arenas for civil society, local elites and sectoral actors. However, it also generated uneven capacity, fragmented accountability, and persistent central-local bargaining (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Bünte & Ufen, 2009; Hadiz, 2010). More recent scholarship on the Jokowi and Prabowo periods warns that executive consolidation, military involvement in civilian affairs, and narrowing civic space may coexist with technically justified reforms (Mietzner, 2021; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). This article does not assume that governance reversal is identical to democratic backsliding; rather, it treats democratic backsliding as a possible political environment in which governance reversal may become riskier.

Accordingly, the study is guided by the following research questions: RQ1: How does governance reversal manifest in the three Indonesian policy domains examined in this study? RQ2: What

patterns and mechanisms characterize failure-driven governance reversals across different policy domains? RQ3: What drives governance reversal, and how does it reshape state-society relations through corrective capacity or pathological centralization?

By answering these questions, the article makes three contributions. The most important conceptual contribution concerns the literature on governance reversal, which has not been connected to the debate on governance failure. Second, it is an inquiry into the mechanisms and conditions that are at work when governing is reversed. Third, it engages with the normative questions that this reversal might raise, and how it can be a corrective, but also disruptive, force. Related concepts such as recentralization, state resurgence, and policy reversal have been developed. However, governance reversal is treated here as a broader and distinct concept that better reflects the processual relationship between governance failure, political interpretation, and the reconfiguration of institutionalized governance structures. Governance reversal is proposed as a meta-concept for this process. This indicates that governance reversal is not a new phenomenon, but rather a conceptual synthesis that explicitly demonstrates how governance processes are interlinked after governance failure.

Method

This qualitative study combines an integrative systematic literature review with a document-based, structured case analysis. A literature review was conducted through Scopus searches on governance failure, implementation gaps, institutional erosion, policy reversal, democratic backsliding, and state reassertion. After screening peer-reviewed articles for relevance and full-text availability, the final conceptual corpus was synthesized interpretively rather than statistically, following the methods of previous studies (Muluk et al., 2023, 2025). The purpose of this review is concept building, not effect size estimation. The empirical component clarifies that the three Indonesian cases are not statistically representative. They were purposively selected as maximum-variation illustrative cases because they display different forms of governance reversal: regulatory takeover in halal certification, welfare centralization in MBG, and

securitized public-goods provision in territorial battalions. This logic allows us to examine whether a common failure-reversal pattern appears across substantively different policy domains while avoiding over-generalization from a small-N design.

The case analysis draws on independent documentary materials. The empirical corpus consists of legislation and institutional documents where available, including Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance, Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 on the National Nutrition Agency, and Presidential Regulation No. 153 of 2024 on the Halal Product Assurance Organizing Agency, official agency information and public statements, and mass media reporting from national and international outlets. These materials are used to identify institutional decisions, authority allocation, public justifications, and implementation controversies, as shown in Table 1.

No elite interviews were conducted for this study. Therefore, the claims are deliberately limited to documentable institutional changes, publicly reported policy narratives, and observable shifts in formal roles. Therefore, this study avoids claims about hidden motivations, actual implementation effectiveness, or final policy outcomes that cannot be verified from

the available documentary and media corpus. Coding proceeded in four steps: (1) identifying the pre-reversal governance arrangement, (2) identifying the stated or perceived failure condition, (3) coding the political interpretation or justification of the failure, and (4) coding the institutional decision that reallocated authority, expanded bureaucracy, or shifted the governance mode. The same coding categories were applied across the three cases to improve transparency and allow future comparative testing, as shown in Table 2.

Results and Discussion
RQ1 and RQ2: Manifestations, Patterns, and Mechanisms of Governance Reversal
Conceptual Pattern: Cyclical Dynamics of Governance Reversal

While not empirical, this section highlights a pattern expressed in the literature. These writings inform but do not directly create subsequent discoveries. The rise of governance models is closely linked with earlier theories of state failure. However, as Jessop (1999) observes, after “the turn to the market” under neoliberalism in the 1980s prompted the failure of the policies of “state intervention” in the preceding

Table 1. Case selection logic and empirical basis

Case	Form of governance reversal	Empirical basis	Analytical function and expected pathway
Halal certification reform	Regulatory takeover / authority reclamation	Law No. 33/2014; later institutional restructuring through BPJPH; official rules on the continued role of MUI fatwa, and halal inspection bodies.	Tests whether authority can move from religious/civil society certification toward state-regulated certification while preserving some non-state roles. Mainly corrective capacity, with the risk of reduced civil society autonomy.
Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG)	Welfare centralization / direct public-goods provision	Presidential Regulation No. 83/2024 establishing BGN; budget and implementation statements; media reporting on rollout logistics and food safety controversies.	Tests whether state welfare expansion addresses perceived nutrition and service delivery gaps. The outcome depends on implementation capacity and monitoring.
Territorial development battalions	Securitized public-goods provision / military involvement	Public reporting on territorial development battalions and their stated roles in agriculture, animal husbandry, health, engineering, and food security.	Tests whether crisis and security narratives move public goods provision into coercive or military institutions. There is a higher risk of pathological centralization and civil-military accountability concerns.

Source: Author

Table 2. Formalized failure-reversal typology and propositions

Sequence	Analytical dimension	Core proposition and observable indicators	Outcome pathway
Stage 1: Failure condition	Institutional change	P1: Governance reversal is more likely when decentralized or networked arrangements are perceived to generate fragmentation, weak compliance, or implementation gaps. Indicators: overlapping mandates, fragmented service delivery, uneven standards, and weak monitoring.	Open space for corrective capacity if failure is diagnosed accurately.
Stage 2: Political interpretation	Policy justification	P2: Failure becomes reversible only when political actors frame it as a crisis of welfare, public need, legality, or national security that requires a stronger state intervention. Indicators: narratives of crisis, urgency, welfare protection, legality, food security, and national resilience.	Can become symbolic institutionalism if justification substitutes implementation capacity.
Stage 3: Institutional reconfiguration	Authority shift and governance mode	P3: Reversal occurs when authority is formally reassigned from non-state, local, market, or networked arrangements to state agencies, central bureaucracies, or coercive institutions. Indicators: new agencies, mandatory rules, expanded executive discretion, and military or bureaucratic operational roles.	Corrective capacity is paired with accountability and capacity; pathological centralization occurs if authority expands without checks.
Cross-cutting condition	Boundary condition	P4: The effects of governance reversal depend on state capacity, accountability design, civil society space, and the strength of non-state veto actors. Indicators: fiscal capacity, administrative competence, parliamentary/judicial oversight, media scrutiny, and civil society participation.	Determines whether the reversal remains corrective or drifts toward democratic backsliding.

Source: Author

decade, a new governance agenda was required because “the turn to the market had not delivered all that had been promised” and “an explicit return to the state was ideologically and politically unacceptable” (Jessop, 1999). Governments in these conditions increasingly turned to “public-private partnerships and similar forms of governance” (Jessop, 1999).

Howlett and Ramesh (2014) develop this idea of phases in wave theory to suggest that governance reform can also be understood as “waves of administrative re-structuring, privatizations, de-regulation and decentralization followed by varying degrees of reversals as the failures of those reforms became apparent”. They make a parallel observation about the transition from market-based regimes to networked governance, but note that the idea that they have banished all the problems of hierarchy “is no more than an article of faith” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2014).

Governance Expansion and Structural Limits

The shift from government to governance has been framed in terms of more decentralized, networked and multi-actor coordination, placing the emphasis on flexibility, cooperation and the involvement of non-state actors in the coordination of public issues. A careful re-reading of this literature suggests that the shift to governance is not always a stabilizing force. In fact, it can cause new forms of systemic fragility through fragmentation, incoherence and ambiguity. Research has shown that decentralized, multi-level governance systems are often fragmented along various governance levels with overlapping authority and inconsistent policy implementation (Fermeglia, 2023; Vince, 2015; Park, 2021). The parallel but uncoordinated action strategies of intergovernmental actors are also influenced by the fact that actors at the levels involved share the same institutional logics (Fermeglia, 2023). In these cases, policymaking often

takes place in the dark, one institution not knowing the action of another institution, which can lead to inefficiency (Fermeglia, 2023).

While coordination failures exist in decentralized governance, they also exist in network and collaborative governance. Collaborative governance, which is intended to be more inclusive and flexible, nonetheless has been described as entailing weak steering capacity and diffuse accountability, making it difficult to force implementation and ensure compliance with decisions (Seidemann et al., 2025; Yar, 2011; Jones, 2023). Thus there is a risk of governance overload without efficiency gains, of flexibility leading to incoherence, and of the layering of new forms of governance over existing institutions producing more complexities rather than simplifying the governance landscape. Instead of replacing forms of hierarchy, governance is layered on top, resulting in institutional congestion and policy overload (Vince, 2015; Pistor, 2009). The resulting layering of governance reduces the quality of decisionmaking and decreases the capacity for dealing with complex policy problems. This illustrates a second form of structural inertia: the expansion of governance can weaken coordination, coherence, and effectiveness because it increases complexity.

Governance Failure: From Implementation Gaps to Systemic Breakdown

To overcome these structural limitations governance failure has been conceived as a multi-dimensional concept that includes, amongst others, technical, institutional and political dimensions. On the level of technical capacity, governance failure is broadly understood as the issue of lack of policy analytical capacity, weak monitoring systems and lack of evaluation mechanisms that hamper the operationalization of policy (Clare & Creed, 2014; Richardson, 2009; Zhou & Schubert, 2025). These problems appear as implementation gaps, such as when adopted rules or policies are not effective when put into practice. Especially in terms of governance failure, the institutional cause is considered to be a lack of fit between policy design and implementation context, particularly in multi-level governance. In situations of polycentricity, where the power over governance is split

across multiple actors and jurisdictions, negotiations for coordination are required, which will more likely lead to conflict and inconsistency (Fermeglia, 2023; Park, 2021; Vince, 2015). Consequently, incoherent policy cycles and ineffective governance interventions are likely. At the political level, governance failure may be constructed through planned behavior such as blame avoidance and narrative construction. Evidence suggests, for example, that failure has often been reframed through scapegoating mechanisms to allow political actors to deflect blame from system failures (Pettus, 2020; Huda et al., 2025). By contrast, it can act as a discursive resource through narratives of crisis and inefficiency which govern changes to institutional practices. However, governance failure does not always lead to corrective action. This is instead most often the product of institutional inertia, competing interests, and limited learning. In some cases, governance systems become locked in cycles of policy churn and unstable compromise, in which policy reform is constantly reintroduced without altering the structural problems at hand (Jones, 2023; Pistor, 2009). This persistence suggests that failure is not incidental to governance systems but is instead a structural characteristic.

Re-statization and Authority Reclamation

In response to these failures, the literature is ever more concerned with processes of re-statization or state resurgence. Here, the state expands its power by re-regulating areas where power has been transferred to non-state agents. For example, centralized bureaucratic regulation is increasingly produced by authority reclamation, that is, the state regains functions of governance that were previously assigned to non-state agents, such as individuals or civil society. In another approach, regulatory regimes that were once voluntary regimes or market-based regimes are transformed into mandatory, state-led regulatory regimes (Giessen et al., 2016; Yu & He, 2011; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014), reflecting the inadequacies of self-regulation and the increased need for state intervention in the face of important market failures.

These trends are related to the expansion of state capacity in the provision of public goods. The state

increasingly provides services in areas such as health, food security and social security, especially in crises. The U-turns imply a strengthening of state-centric governance structures in which the state plays both a regulatory and a provider role, although the risks associated with re-statization have attracted academic attention in some parts of the literature. In this context, greater state intervention does not necessarily lead to better performance. Instead, centralization may result in minimum compliance, indicating that bureaucratic growth fails to address underlying governance issues (Zhou & Schubert, 2025; Shava et al., 2025). This failure can also be attributed to insufficient analytical and evaluative capacity for state intervention, making re-statization merely a symbolic gesture (Richardson, 2009; Clare & Creed, 2014). Therefore, re-statization must be understood as an ambiguous process that can improve or weaken effective governance.

Governance Reversal as Failure-Driven Institutional Reconfiguration

This study defines the concept of governance reversal as institutional reconfiguration due to failure. Reversal reconfigures the governance schemes by responding to perceived or ex-post failures. Governance reversal has three dimensions: changes in institutions, change in authority, and justification. Second, the reversal of governance through new state agencies and the extension of state bureaucracy suggests that the power of the state in terms of coordinating and implementing policy is in a stronger position than before, and a change in the structure of governance is occurring. This dimension is that of governance reversal, the transferring of competencies from non-state actors back to the state, meaning a re-embedding of competencies that had been previously privatized or decentralized back into the nation-state, thus a change from a networked to a hierarchical structure.

Third, governance reversal comes with discursive justification in the form of claims that institutional changes respond directly to crisis, inefficiency, or public need. For example, governance reversals are often framed as adaptive improvements or efficiency gains even when they entail meaningful centralization

of governance (Liu et al., 2025; Brown & Thai, 2024; De Simone, 2018). Crucially, governance reversal is a political phenomenon shaped by elite preferences, institutional features, and socio-political contexts, all of which condition the nature of governance reversal and its outcomes (Dim & Asomah, 2025; Englebert & Mungongo, 2016; Dussauge-Laguna, 2022). Governance reversal, therefore, is a politically mediated process of institutional change. A more systematic description of the governance/government distinction could be that a “governance system is based on a set of rules ... delegated to a third-party, independent agency” whereas “a government system is based on a political executive ... with discretionary powers” (Nicoli, 2016). Following this understanding, governance reversal is not simply greater involvement of the state but the reversion of the underlying logic of authority from delegation based on rules to the discretion of political executives and administrative control.

Governance Reversal and Democratic Backsliding

Governance reversal and democratic backsliding are theoretically similar, as governance reversal includes reversals between different forms of governance while democratic backsliding includes the deterioration of democratic norms and institutions. The same governance failures, including decreasing participation, institutionalization, and socio-political polarization, support both trends. Evidence suggests that erosions of core liberties and declines in participation are becoming more common in democracies, limiting their capacity for good governance (Campos et al., 2024). This combined with the lack of institutional innovation has made it less and less possible for governance systems to keep up with the growing complexity of such challenges (Campos et al., 2024). Reversion of governance may be accompanied by reassertion of executive power and weakening of accountability mechanisms. While reassertion of state authority may help improve coordination, it can lead to concentration of power and democratic backsliding, particularly in illiberal regimes (Khaitan, 2020; Esfahani & Masoudnia, 2025; Hajnal & Jeziorska, 2021).

However, democratic backsliding does not happen every time governance is reversed, and whether it happens does also depend on factors such as state capacity and the design of institutions. The governance reversal is presented as both a cure to governance problems and a potential source of instability. Governance reversal entails changes to the relationship between the state and society in addition to those at the institutional and state levels. It is expressed in the re-centralization of authority, participation, and influence. Civil society actors are incorporated into governance through formalized roles in state-led development projects but may also be marginalized through the closing down of governance spaces outside the state. The second logic is that to reverse this governance strengthens the state but requires that ordinary people relate to, bargain with, and resist that state differently. Governance reversal might also be aligned with patterns of executive aggrandizement. Khaitan (2020) suggests that governance reversal can be addressed in an accountability framework - in terms of 'dimensions', namely "vertical, ... horizontal ... and diagonal" - if the response is "subtle, indirect, and incremental, but also systemic". In this case, governance reversal may be understood as incremental changes in accountability structures, as illustrated by the metaphor of "killing a constitution by a thousand cuts".

Analytically, governance reversal differs from democratic backsliding in terms of the object and level of analysis. Democratic backsliding frameworks focus on the deterioration of democratic competition, civil liberties, checks and balances, and accountability institutions, often measured through regime-level indicators such as V-Dem or analyzed through processes of executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). In contrast, governance reversal focuses on the reallocation of governing authority after a perceived governance failure. It captures how regulatory, welfare, or security functions move from networked, decentralized, or non-state arrangements toward state-centered arrangements. The two processes can overlap when state reassertion weakens accountability; however, governance reversal can also occur in democratic settings when it is constrained by law, oversight, and continued participation.

Theoretical Positioning: A Failure–Reversal Framework

Second, and drawing on the syntheses above, this study approaches the governance reversal in terms of the failure-reversal model. That is, governance systems produce the failure conditions of fragmentation, coordination failures, implementation gaps, and legitimacy failures (Fermeglia, 2023; Clare & Creed, 2014; Park, 2021; Vince, 2015). Second, failures are interpreted and mobilized through discourses that draw on narratives of crisis and inefficiency to legitimize institutional change (Pettus, 2020; Huda et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025). Third, governance reversal is characterized by a change of authority configuration through institutional restructuring, centralization, and variation in modes of governance (Giessen et al., 2016; Yu & He, 2011; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014). The findings underscore the importance of mediating variables, such as state capacity, regime type, and social conditions, in interpreting the effects of governance reversal on stability: governance reversal can either remedy or reproduce instability. This failure-reversal framework was constructed through an integrative view of governance literature and was exemplified with the study of the Indonesian case. So the framework does not generally apply to all countries; it is contingent upon particular configurations of institutions, state capacity and political conditions. Governance stresses "heterarchic interaction, negotiation and coordination", while state-building stresses "hierarchic order, control and regulation". However, "a strong state is needed to provide the footstone for governance because of the risks associated with governance failure and the necessity of meta-governance", as Yu and He (2011) put it. From here, these attempts appear as isolated attempts to rebuild the state's capacity for collective action and serve under conditions when coordinating and enforcing compliance is impossible.

Empirical Pattern: From Governance to Government

To further develop the argument presented above, this section describes a limited set of Indonesian public policy developments that are representative of broader changes in governance, but that do not intrinsically

include a complete narrative of governance change in Indonesia. The examples further define patterns of governance reversal. The overall pattern of movement across most policy domains is from decentralized, networked or social governance arrangements to reasserted state-led governance arrangements in policy design, policy implementation, or both, where those arrangements have been perceived to have failed to deliver coordination, compliance or legitimacy in cooperation with the state. Three patterns can be distilled (across cases). First, governance arrangements fall apart due to a fragmentation of authority across multiple actors and institutional levels. The result of this fragmentation is policy incoherence, overlaps, contradictions, and ultimately implementation deficits of policy (Fermeglia, 2023; Vince, 2015; Park, 2021). Second, implementation deficits occur across various governance regimes, due to weak policy analytical capacities, lack of coherent monitoring, and practice fragmentation in evaluating programs (Clare & Creed, 2014; Richardson, 2009). Third, governance arrangements may lack legitimacy if they do not deliver anticipated benefits or in the case of distrust in the capacity and performance of agencies implementing the decision (Zhu et al., 2025; Hamm et al., 2023). Foreseeably, the transforming states increasingly assert their re-claimed authority by re-building their state apparatus, by re-configuring state institutions and by a re-expansion of the state's role across a collection of policy domains. As such, the transition from governance to government implies a transition from coordination to control, from dispersed to re-combined rule. Empirically, the governance reversal occurred along a cumulative path that consisted of

crisis management, political concentration and the rise of state capacities (see: Figure 1).

Figure 1 is used as an analytical condensation of the Indonesian trajectory, rather than as a standalone illustration. It depicts a sequential but non-deterministic movement from crisis response to political centralization and then to state capacity expansion. The arrows should not be read as proof that every crisis automatically produces centralization; instead, they show how crisis narratives can make centralizing decisions politically thinkable and administratively feasible in the long run.

Case 1 – Reclaiming Authority: Halal Certification Reform

Reversal of governance can take a variety of forms. Here, we identify three forms of governance reversal: regulatory takeover, welfare expansion, and provision of securitized public goods (see Figure 2). In the first empirical case, the reversion of governance takes place through authority reclamation, that is, the state reclaims control over a regulatory domain previously governed by non-state actors.

Figure 2 summarizes the three empirical forms used for concept building. Halal certification captures regulatory takeovers, MBG capture welfare expansion, and territorial battalions capture securitized public-goods provision. The three forms were selected because they vary across the regulatory, welfare, and security domains, allowing us to test whether governance reversal operates beyond a single policy sector.

The first empirical case is of governance reversal through authority reclamation, where the state reclaims authority over a domain previously governed by non-state actors.




Figure 1. Governance Reversal Dynamics in the Indonesian Context

Source: Authors' analyses (2026)




Figure 2. Form of Governance Reversal

Source: Author analyses (2026)

Prior to the establishment of state certification, halal governance was a non-state system in which religious and Islamic organizations served as the main agents of halal certification. Such a system was guided by social legitimacy and voluntary compliance. The state-led certification regime represents a shift to centralized regulation.

This study qualifies this claim to avoid overestimating the displacement. The shift to BPJPH did not eliminate religious authority; rather, it changed the institutional position of the religious organizations. Under the statutory halal assurance model, the BPJPH becomes the state organizer of certification, while the MUI retains a role in issuing halal fatwas, and halal inspection bodies remain involved in technical examinations. This means that the governance role of religious organizations is transformed from a primary certifier toward a more formalized and state-recognized component of the certification chain. Therefore, the state-society effect is not a simple exclusion but incorporation under state rules.

Empirical work confirms that transitions occur from private governance in response to the failure of private systems to provide standardization, accountability, or enforcement. In this sense, state bureaucracies reclaim authority over private governance regimes, marking a transition from voluntary private governance to mandatory state regulation (Giessen et al., 2016; Howlett & Ramesh, 2014; Yu & He, 2011). This can be seen as part of a general trend toward re-statization, with the state now able to play a more active role in coordination

and compliance. Theoretically, the case illustrates governance reversal as functional correction, wherein the state is called on to remedy the failures of fragmentation and non-enforcement. However, it also raises questions about the redistribution and reallocation of political authority and whether and how social actors are marginalized in the process. Thus, governance reversal involves repair, but it also works to redistribute governance powers.

Case 2 – Public Goods Re-centralization: Free Nutritious Meals (MBG)

Another reversal of state-led decentralization of public goods provision is when the state enlarges the public goods provision, often in household production or in the local community provision of public goods. An example of such a reversal is the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) Program. Heretofore, food consumption and nutrition have been firmly grounded in familial practice, and the country's state-run feeding program, which covers the entire country, is viewed as a major shift towards providing welfare as a duty of the state. Following trends in the state developing greater responsibility where previous governance regimes have failed to ensure equitable access to public goods, states assume direct provision of public goods when decentralized governance or market mechanisms fail to account for the interests of all in society (Zhou & Schubert, 2025; Shava et al., 2025). Such interventionist practices are often justified in the name of social protection, public good, and national development.

The empirical reading in this study treats MBG as an emerging case of welfare centralization because Presidential Regulation No. 83/2024 created the National Nutrition Agency as a dedicated national bureaucracy for nutrition fulfillment. This case does not prove that centralized meal provision is more effective. It shows an institutional decision to move nutrition fulfillment from dispersed households, schools, local providers, and community practices into a centrally coordinated public program. Communities, schools, kitchens, and local suppliers are therefore not removed from the governance arrangement; instead, they are repositioned as implementers or delivery partners within a national state-led chain. Media reports on rollout and food safety incidents were used only to identify implementation risks, not to make final claims about program success or failure.

Nevertheless, much of the scholarship also points out that state provision cannot solve all governance problems, as administrative capacity can limit the substantive effectiveness of centrally implemented programs to minimum standards (Zhou & Schubert, 2025). Without effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, the programs can therefore be performative rather than transformative (Richardson, 2009; Clare & Creed, 2014). To that end, the MBG case provides an example of governance reversal as welfare-driven centralization, where the expanding state intervenes to fill in the perceived gaps in public goods provision. At the same time, it underscores the importance of institutional capacity for the success of such interventions.

Case 3 – Militarization of Public Goods: Territorial Battalions

The third is the militarization of the governance reversal, for instance through the establishment of territorial battalions and other forms of military involvement in the provision of public goods such as food security. An example of this is that governance is securitized and public goods are considered a matter of national security. The vision of the state as a provider of security through the military, as opposed to simply a provider of administrative functions, goes beyond the customary conception. Governance failure does not intrinsically discuss militarization, but can help identify

the conditions in which militarizing decisions are made. During crisis, uncertainty, or lack of governance, governments use centralized hierarchical mechanisms to ensure control and expedience (Yu & He, 2011; Wenham & Davies, 2023), prioritizing efficiency and authority over participation and deliberation. This case theoretically confirms the reversal of governance through securitized centralization: the centralization and expansion of state power through the unification of fragmented coercive institutions can increase the capacity for coordination and responsiveness, but risks accountability mechanisms, civil-military relations, and the entrenchment of governance practices that weaken democratic values. Governance reversals may also include changes in the institutionalized ways by which society is integrated into or excluded from governing. There are state-based systems where society is included as a more formalized and regulated actor, as well as systems where social actors are governed through a more centralized decision-making structure, with their agency being diminished. These patterns suggest that governance reversal involves not only a change in governance modes but also a reconceptualization of the state-society relationship.

This study treats the territorial battalion case as an emerging and high-uncertainty case. Available public reports indicate that territorial development battalions have been associated with agriculture, animal husbandry, health, engineering, and food security tasks. Therefore, this study avoids claiming the completed militarization of food governance. Instead, it analyzes the formal and discursive movement by which public goods, especially food security, are increasingly framed through territorial defense and national resilience. This is sufficient for identifying governance reversal risk but not for judging long-term policy performance.

RQ3: Drivers, State-Society Effects, and Outcome Pathways of Governance Reversal Patterns and Mechanisms of Governance Reversal

Governance reversal is not simply a reverse transformation of individual institutional features but constitutes a patterned, multi-dimensional change of elements such as authority, institutional

structure, policy logic and policy mode, which are usually seen as separate governance mechanisms. In this study, however, they are integrated into an overarching analysis framework, highlighting the patterned configuration of the governance reversal depicted in **Figure 3**.

Figure 3 illustrates the framework's four observable dimensions. Institutional change refers to the creation or expansion of formal state organizations, authority shift refers to the relocation of decision-making from social, market, or local actors to state actors, policy justification refers to narratives of crisis, welfare, legality, or security, and governance mode refers to the movement from negotiated coordination toward hierarchical control. These dimensions are subsequently linked to the two outcome pathways formalized in **Table 2**.




Figure 3. Patterns of Governance Reversal

Source: Author analyses (2026)

The first dimension of governance change, changes in institutions, entails the reconfiguration of governance arrangements through the establishment or expansion of state functions. Empirical evidence suggests that fragmentation and coordination loss in governance systems lead to pressure for institutional consolidation. In this context, newly created bureaucratic units in a decentralized system are not simply organizational expansions but responses to the failure of decentralized governance arrangements. Such institutional paths suggest that incoherence in governance systems is restored through institutional expansion.

The second dimension, authority shift, specifies that decision-making powers are transferred from non-state to state actors. The literature on non-state governance shows that arrangements involving non-state actors often suffer from enforcement and

accountability problems. This may entail a reversion to the state's role in enforcing compliance and uniformity (Svensson, 2021; Knudsen, 2011) and reflect a broader shift in the locus of coordination from negotiated arrangements among parties to hierarchical management.

The third dimension, policy justification, concerns how discursive practices construct legitimacy for the regime's undoing. Institutional reversal is not framed as a coup but as a response to an impasse, welfare crisis, or national security issue. Research on policy failure and blame framing suggests that such narratives can shape how governance shortcomings are interpreted and legitimated, particularly when failures are framed as crises requiring institutional change (Pettus, 2020; Huda et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025). Governance reversal is therefore a discursively mediated process that involves narratives of necessity, as well as a process of structural change.

The fourth dimension of governance mode is the shift towards a higher level of hierarchy, moving coordination and control from networked and collaborative to command-control governance. The primary reason given for this is the efficiency and speed of decision-making, particularly in crises. However, the literature suggests that these transitions could limit flexibility and participation and introduce new governance challenges while solving others (Downes & Lai, 2025; Paruchuri et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2011).

These dimensions are interdependent, and governance reversal is a multi-layered institutional reconfiguration: centralization is reinforced by institutional expansion, structural change is discursively justified, and governance mode transformation consolidates the shift towards centralization. This relationship is what makes governance reversal seem to be an effective change rather than a series of unrelated changes.

Moreover, the process of governance reversal can take varying paths, since it is not necessarily even and can have different consequences when certain dimensions come together. It can be corrected via reassertion, that is, policy and coordination, provided that institutional and bureaucratic expansion are matched by coherent policy implementation, with a

positive effect on the state. Second, it can result in pathological centralization, which results in authority transfer without addressing governance failures, resulting in overload (Williams, 2020; Halmai, 2023). Third, governance reversal could turn into an illiberal transformation, with centralization creating the agglomeration of powers and diminishing accountability (Bertacchini & Gould, 2021; Jessop, 2008). Finally, the process of reversal can involve symbolic institutionalism, in which reforms are more discursive in nature and lead to minor governance changes (Best, 2014; Efrat & Newman, 2018). **Figure 3** is therefore not merely a simplified illustration of these dynamics but a condensed representation of their structural, political, and procedural dimensions. This shows that governance reversal cannot be understood as a linear transition from governance to government, but as a non-linear process of reconfiguring authority, shaped by governance logics, institutional environments, and political narratives of change. In other words, governance reversal is linked to failure, political interpretation, and institutional change. It is not simply a shift in governance modes but is defined by state reassertion as a mode of governance. It does not resolve conflicts and contradictions within governance regimes but alters them, including their reproduction at a different scale. In this sense, these findings question the linear evolution of governance and suggest that governance and government should be understood as co-evolving, rather than oppositional, modes of organizing authority.

Discussion: Mechanisms and Implications of Governance Reversal

Drawing on the theoretical framework provided in the previous section, governance reversal can be understood as a structurally embedded but episodic attempt to remedy the internal contradictions of a governance system. It is not a piecemeal institutional transfer but a structured response to governance deficits caused by fragmentation, coordination failure, and implementation deficits (Park, 2021). RQ1 shows that governance reversal is driven by the interplay between authority shifts, institutional changes, and policy justification. Authority shifts occur when governance arrangements based on non-

state actors fail to ensure compliance, coordination, or standardization. Empirically, such arrangements often contain enforcement gaps and accountability deficits that incentivize the state to reassert control over affected policy sectors (Svensson, 2021). Similarly, weak capacity to enforce hierarchically weak governance arrangements leads to implementation gaps, regulatory fragmentation, or both (Richardson, 2009). Second, institutional restructuring occurs when existing or newly created state institutions expand to restore policy coherence. The literature suggests that institutional consolidation may be pursued when decentralized arrangements fail to produce integrated results (Yu & He, 2011). This suggests, as in Section 2, that the state is more effective in rebuilding capacity under uncertainty and institutional pressure.

Third, policy justification is linked to the legitimacy of governing reversals. State intervention is not simply the centralization of power but is discursively justified as a response to crises or inefficiency. These explanations follow a similar pattern in the policy failure and blame avoidance literature, where actors explain failure to justify institutional change (Pettus, 2020; Liu et al., 2025). Thus, governance reversal is not only structural but also discursive and political. Together, these mechanisms show governance reversal as a chain of failure, interpretation, and institutional reconfiguration, adding to governance theory by explaining how state reassertion is operationalized. Regarding RQ2, governance reversal can lead in two directions. However, it could be used to generate corrective state capacity when coordination failures or fragmentation occur. Centralization can facilitate policy coherence, reduce transaction costs, and enhance the effectiveness of policy interventions in complex fields. Thus, governance reversal can help alleviate the weaknesses of decentralized governance. Conversely, it also poses the danger of pathological centralization and a deterioration of democracy. Real-world examples suggest that without checks and balances, centralization can lead to governance pathologies, such as excessive bureaucracy, lack of transparency, and deficits in democratic participation (Halmai, 2023). Concentrated authority may also produce executive dominance and erode checks and balances, corresponding to other forms of institutional erosion (Khaitan, 2020).

The results suggest a trade-off such that capacity is improved in some areas with reverse governance but that new vulnerabilities are also created in others, but these processes are not mutually exclusive. This supports the notion that institutional design does not dictate institutional outcomes, but instead is a product of how political realities and design come together in the implementation process (Clare & Creed, 2014; Jones, 2023). The linking mechanisms and consequences contribute to researchers' understanding of the recursive nature of governance change as institutional failure, meaning, and change. Of course, for each country, according to the type of regime, administrative tradition, and society, the governance reversal mechanism will be different from the failure-reversal mechanism of Indonesia's experience. Hence, governance reversal is a relational process: the change in the state's domain goes together with the change in society's roles, expectations, and capacities. Thus, it is also about the restructuring of state-society relations rather than only about institutional restructuring.

Boundary and scope conditions

The framework is applicable under six scope conditions. First, there must be a prior governance arrangement in which authority is decentralized, delegated, privatized, or dispersed across networks. Second, the arrangement must face a visible or politically constructed failure condition such as fragmentation, implementation gaps, low compliance, weak monitoring, or declining legitimacy. Third, the state must possess at least the minimum administrative, fiscal, legal, or coercive capacity to reclaim authority. Fourth, political actors must be able to justify reassertion through a legitimate public narrative, such as welfare protection, legality, emergencies, or national security. Fifth, non-state actors must either lack veto capacity or be incorporable into a new state-led arrangement. Sixth, accountability institutions must determine whether a reversal remains corrective or becomes pathological. The framework is less likely to travel to contexts where the state lacks basic implementation capacity, non-state governance remains strongly legitimate and effective, or legal and political institutions prevent the executive from reallocating authority. It is also less useful for explaining purely ideological policy reversals that do not involve authority relocation or democratic

backsliding that occurs without a governance-failure narrative. These limits were retained to avoid overextending the concept.

Conclusion

This study concludes that governance reversal is a useful but scope-conditioned concept for contemporary governance analysis. It manifests when perceived failures of decentralized, networked, market-based, or non-state governance generate political justification for reasserting state authority. In the Indonesian cases examined here, governance reversal appears through regulatory takeover in halal certification, welfare centralization in the MBG, and securitized public-goods provision through territorial development battalions. Our findings would suggest that governance reversal is not just a return to government as hierarchical state, but a hybrid reconfiguration where state power and authority is expanded, and where some social, market or community actors are incorporated into state-led implementation chains. However, the effects are mixed. Under conditions of sufficient capacity, transparency and accountability, reversal can reduce fragmentation and strengthen coordination. Conversely, under conditions of weak oversight, symbolic institutionalism or executive dominance, reversal can reinforce centralization as well as contribute to democratic erosion. The article uses Indonesia as a theoretically generative case rather than a generalizable model. Future comparative research across policy areas and countries should use qualitative interviews, implementation data and longitudinal evidence to test the viability of the failure-reversal framework.

References

- Aspinall, E., & Fealy, G. (2003). Introduction: Decentralization, democratization, and the rise of the local. *Local power and politics in Indonesia: Decentralization and democratisation*, 1-11.
- Bassoli, M., & Campomori, F. (2024). Re thinking policy and (multi level) governance failure: What went wrong and why in the reception of Ukrainian refugees in Italy?. *Governance*, 37(4), 1391-1411.

- Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 5-19.
- Bertacchini, E., & Gould, P. (2021). Collective action dilemmas at cultural heritage sites: An application of the IAD-NAAS framework. *International Journal of the Commons*, 15(1), 276-290. <https://doi.org/10.5334/ijc.1089>
- Best, J. (2014). *Governing failure: Provisional expertise and the transformation of global development finance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bremmer, I. (2010). Article commentary: The end of the free market: Who wins the war between states and corporations?. *European View*, 9(2), 249-252.
- Brown, I. A., & Thai, M. T. T. (2024). The proliferation of neoliberal ideology: A study of international anti-corruption discourse through the lens of institutional entrepreneurship theory. *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development*, 8(8), 4295.
- Bünte, M., & Ufen, A. (Eds.). (2009). Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia (p. 102). London: Routledge.
- Campos, I., Fuchs, D., Repo, P., Jager, W., Klöckner, C., Wang, S., ... & Živčič, L. (2024). What role can democracy labs play in co-creating democratic innovations for sustainability?. *Socio-Ecological Practice Research*, 6(4), 367-380.
- Clare, S., & Creed, I. F. (2014). Tracking wetland loss to improve evidence-based wetland policy learning and decision-making. *Wetlands ecology and management*, 22(3), 235-245.
- De Simone, S. (2018). Playing the 'fragile state' card: the SPLM and state extraversion in South Sudan. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 56(3), 395-420.
- Dim, E. E., & Asomah, J. Y. (2025). Political transition, structural inequality, and the persistence of bribery in Ghana (1999-2022). *Journal of Developing Societies*, 41(4), 493-521. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X251351798>
- Downes, J. F., & Lai, K. (2025). EU-China relations in a post-COVID-19 world order: the context of the BRI project. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 7, 1644327.
- Dussauge-Laguna, M. I. (2022). The promises and perils of populism for democratic policymaking: The case of Mexico. *Policy sciences*, 55(4), 777-803.
- Efrat, A., & Newman, A. L. (2018). Divulging data: Domestic determinants of international information sharing. *The Review of International Organizations*, 13(3), 395-419.
- Englebert, P., & Mungongo, E. K. (2016). Misguided and misdiagnosed: The failure of decentralization reforms in the DR of Congo. *African Studies Review*, 59(1), 5-32.
- Esfahani, A. S., & Masoudnia, H. (2025). Turkey under Erdoğan: Investigating the relationship between populism and governance quality since 2013. *Politics and Governance*, 13.
- Fermeglia, M. (2023). When decentralization strikes back: The example of climate governance in Belgium. *Revista d'estudis autonòmics i federals*, (37), 93-126.
- Giessen, L., Burns, S., Sahide, M. A. K., & Wibowo, A. (2016). From governance to government: The strengthened role of state bureaucracies in forest and agricultural certification. *Policy and society*, 35(1), 71-89.
- Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (2014). Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance.
- Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (2024a). Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 on the National Nutrition Agency.
- Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (2024b). Presidential Regulation No. 153 of 2024 on the Halal Product Assurance Organizing Agency.
- Guardian. (2025, August 28). In Prabowo's Indonesia, the military is quietly creeping back into civilian life.
- Hadiz, V. (2010). *Localizing power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asian perspective*. Stanford University Press.
- Hajnal, G., & Jeziorska, I. (2021). Collaborative governance regimes in illiberal democracies: A comparative case of drug harm reduction policy in Central-Eastern Europe. *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, 17(62), 60-80.

- Halmai, G. (2023). Rule of law backsliding and memory politics in Hungary. *European Constitutional Law Review*, 19(4), 602-622.
- Hamm, J. A., Carrera, J. S., Van Fossen, J. A., Key K. D., Woolford S. J., Bailey S. B., ... & Calhoun, K. D. (2023). Conceptualizing trust and distrust as alternative stable states: Lessons from the Flint water crisis. *Ecology and society: a journal of integrative science for resilience and sustainability*, 28(3), 14.
- Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2014). The two orders of governance failure: Design mismatches and policy capacity issues in modern governance. *Policy and Society*, 33(4), 317-327.
- Huda, A. M., Nurwahid, A. F., Firmannandya, A., Tsuroyya, & Ismail, A. (2025). Who's to blame for the Rohingya refugee crisis? Analyzing 'scapegoating' narratives in YouTube news channel commentaries from Indonesia and Malaysia. *Multidisciplinary Science Journal*, 8(2), 2026016. <https://doi.org/10.31893/multiscience.2026016>
- Jessop, B. (1999). The dynamics of partnerships and governance failures. *The new politics of local governance in Britain*, 11-32.
- Jessop, B. (2008). Promoting good governance, disguising governance failure: Reflections on policy paradigms and policy narratives in the field of governance. *Public Governance*, 1(2), 5-25.
- Jones, M. (2023). Spaces of collibration: Governance and metagovernance of failure. *Sociologica*, 17(3), 51-74.
- Khaitan, T. (2020). Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-State Fusion in India. *Law & Ethics of Human Rights*, 14(1), 49-95.
- Knudsen, J. S. (2011). Company delistings from the UN Global Compact: Limited business demand or domestic governance failure?. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 103(3), 331-349.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Penguin Books.
- Liu, D., Mustafa, S. E. B., & Sarmiti, N. Z. B. (2025). From zero-COVID to global alignment: Transnational pressures and China's pandemic communication transformation. *Globalization and Health*, 21(1), 1-13.
- Lührmann, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019). A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it?. *Democratization*, 26(7), 1095-1113.
- Mietzner, M. (2021). Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials. *Democratization*, 28(1), 161-178.
- Muluk, M. R. K., Sajida & Durrety, S. F. (2025). Trends, Issues, and Future Directions of Decentralization in Unitary State Research: Bibliometric Analyses from 1975-2024 to. *KnE Social Sciences*, 10(4), 262-285.
- Muluk, M. R. K., Sajida, S., Nisa, G. D., & Durrety, S. F. (2023). Comprehending the Notion of Publicness: Unexplored Dimensions and Future Research Initiatives. *BISNIS & BIROKRASI: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Dan Organisasi*, 30(3), 125-135.
- Nicoli, F. (2016). From governance to government? An analysis of the Commission's bid to politicize EMU rules. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731760>
- Park, S. (2021). Politics or bureaucratic failures? Understanding the dynamics of policy failures in democratic governance. *Journal of Policy Studies*, 36(3), 25-36. <https://doi.org/10.52372/kjps36303>
- Paruchuri, S., Hoempler, E. A., Cowen, A. P., Cannella, A. A. Jr., & Nahm, P. I. (2024). Governance failure and governance under failure: Reviewing the role of directors in organizational misconduct. *Journal of Management*, 50(6), 2237-2265.
- Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2000). Citizens versus the new public manager: The problem of mutual empowerment. *Administration & Society*, 32(1), 9-28.
- Pettus, K. (2020). Whiteness, scapegoating, and scarcity: Medicalizing" the US opioid crisis". *Journal of Illicit Economies and Development (JIED)*, 2(1), 29-37.
- Pistor, K. (2009). Sovereign wealth funds, banks, and governments in the global crisis: Towards a new governance of global finance?. *European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR)*, 10(3), 333-352.

- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The new governance: governing without a government. *Political studies*, 44(4), 652-667.
- Richardson, J. R. (2009). Steering without navigation equipment: the lamentable state of Australian health policy reform. *Australia and New Zealand Health Policy*, 6(1), HP090627.
- Rodrik, D. (2021). The right scope of global governance and democracy enhancement. *RED*, 2(1), 36-45.
- Seidemann, I., Weißmüller, K. S., & Geiger, D. (2025). The Downward Spiral of Legitimacy Erosion: Lessons on Network Governance Failure During the German “Refugee Crisis” Public Administration Review.
- Shava, E., Muringa, T. P., & Oladejo, O. M. (2025). “Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child”: Navigating consequence management in local government transformation in South Africa. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 7, 1579256.
- Sun, P., Mellahi, K., & Liu, G. S. (2011). Corporate governance failure and contingent political resources in transition economies: A longitudinal case study. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 28(4), 853-879.
- Svensson, S. (2021). Perspective on sub-national governance of crossborder regions: democratic governance in anti-democratic times. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 3, 710923.
- Vince, J. (2015). Integrated policy approaches and policy failure: The case of Australia’s Oceans Policy. *Policy Sciences*, 48(2), 159-180.
- Warburton, E., & Aspinall, E. (2019). Explaining Indonesia’s democratic regression. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 41(2), 255-285.
- Wenham, C., & Davies, S. E. (2023). What is the ideal World Health Organization (WHO)? *Health Economics, Policy and Law*, 18(3), 329-340.
- Williams, O. D. (2020). COVID-19 and private health: Market and governance failure. *Development*, 63(2), 181-190.
- Yar, M. (2011). From “governance of security” to ‘governance failure’: Refining the criminological agenda. *Internet journal of criminology*, 1-19.
- Yu, J., & He, Z. (2011). The tension between governance and state building. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 16(1), 1-17.
- Zhou, V. S., & Schubert, G. (2025). Minimum Compliance in Local Policy Implementation in Contemporary China: The Case of Municipal Solid Waste Management. *The China Quarterly*, 1-19.
- Zhu, H., Manion, M., & Rothschild, V. (2025). Crisis and Correction: Do Government Rectification Efforts Restore Citizen Trust After Governance Failure. *Political Behavior*, 47(4), 1595-1620.